The Role of UNHCR and International NGOs in the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in Zaire (1996–1997)

The Role of UNHCR and International NGOs in the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in Zaire (1996–1997): Abandonment, Infiltration, Complicity and Humanitarian Failure

The massacres of Hutu refugees in Zaire in 1996–1997 constitute one of the greatest humanitarian scandals of the late twentieth century. It is not merely an episode of extreme violence: it is the story of an abandonment organised and tolerated by the very institutions mandated to protect vulnerable populations. More than 200,000 refugees—according to the International Rescue Committee (IRC)—were killed, disappeared, starved, or died of exhaustion in the Congolese forests. The international community, fully aware of what was coming, did nothing. Worse still, several organisations facilitated, knowingly or unknowingly, the military operations of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the ICRC, Oxfam, CARE and other NGOs were present in the massive Hutu refugee camps near Goma and Bukavu. They were in a unique position to observe the military build-up, anticipate the attacks, and organise even a minimal evacuation or protection effort. Yet no assistance was ever provided to help the refugees flee, even when the dangers were known. Humanitarian personnel left; refugees stayed behind. UNHCR knew the camps would be bombed, but no alternative plan was developed. Worse still, multiple testimonies and analyses indicate that UNHCR employed local staff secretly affiliated with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—individuals who gathered and transmitted intelligence directly to Kigali.

At the heart of this tragedy lies an undeniable truth: Hutu refugees were not only victims of the AFDL and the RPA; they were abandoned by the international system that claimed to protect human rights.

1. An Explosive Context: Refugee Camps as Military and Political Targets

Between July 1994 and 1995, roughly 1.2 million Hutu refugees fled Rwanda following the RPF's victory. The vast majority were civilians:

• women,

• children,

• elderly and sick people,

• traumatised survivors.

Contrary to simplistic narratives, the refugee camps were not "mostly genocidaires." The UN Mapping Report (UN OHCHR, 2010) estimated that over 80% of refugees were civilians uninvolved in the 1994 massacres.

However, these camps represented for the new Rwandan government:

• a political threat,

• a potential base for opposition,

• a refuge for some former FAR officers,

• and an obstacle to the RPF's regional and domestic plans.

As early as 1995, UNHCR internal reports and documents from MSF, Oxfam and CARE described limited militarisation within the camps. A small number of former soldiers attempted to influence food distribution or intimidate refugees. But these conditions did not justify the destruction of entire civilian camps.

The RPF used this as a pretext to prepare a full-scale military offensive whose real objective was far broader than neutralising armed elements. The operation aimed at dismantling the camps entirely, pushing back the population, and eliminating what Kigali perceived as the remnants of a demographic and political threat.

2. UNHCR and NGOs Knew: Warnings, Intelligence, and Infiltration

2.1. Clear warnings of an imminent attack

By August 1996, humanitarian actors had received consistent warnings:

• Rwandan troop movements near the Zaire border,

• rapid training of Banyamulenge troops,

• aerial surveillance of the camps,

• explicit threats issued by RPF officials,

• intelligence from local sources and diplomatic missions.

Human Rights Watch (1997) documents several internal meetings where UNHCR, MSF, UNICEF, ICRC and diplomats discussed a likely RPA attack. UNHCR sent cables to Geneva and New York highlighting a "very high probability" of military intervention.

2.2. Explosive fact: UNHCR employed RPF infiltrators inside the camps

Several independent analyses, testimonies and academic sources indicate that the RPF had infiltrated the humanitarian system inside the camps.
UNHCR—often unknowingly—employed:

• interpreters,

• drivers,

• logisticians,

• community outreach workers

who were, in fact, RPF agents.

Their duties included:

• mapping the camps,

• identifying civilian concentrations,

• locating community leaders,

• monitoring food or health distribution points,

• reporting strategic information directly to RPA commanders.

This covert infiltration provided Kigali with exceptionally precise intelligence, making the coming assault highly efficient.

Researchers such as Peter Uvin (1998), Gérard Prunier (2004), and Filip Reyntjens (2009) have confirmed the existence of these networks of RPF informants.

2.3. Humanitarian withdrawal before the attack

In the days preceding the assault, multiple NGOs quietly evacuated their personnel to Goma or even Kigali.
Testimonies collected by MSF reveal that:

• some NGOs had been "informally warned" to withdraw,

• convoys of expatriates left before the bombardments,

• UNHCR relocated key staff,

• humanitarian leadership anticipated a worst-case scenario.

In short:
humanitarians had time to save themselves, but not the refugees.

3. When the Attack Began: Refugees Abandoned, Humanitarians Nowhere to Be Seen

When the AFDL–RPA launched the offensive in October 1996:

• UNHCR staff had evacuated,

• several major NGOs were no longer present,

• no humanitarian corridor existed,

• no relocation plan had been prepared,

• no effort was made to inform the refugees of the impending danger.

The refugees were caught off-guard. Bombardments targeted civilian areas:

• Mugunga,

• Katale,

• Kahindo,

• Lac Vert,

• Bukavu South,

• Inera.

Human Rights Watch (Shattered Lives, 1997) noted:

"The attacks deliberately targeted densely populated civilian zones."

Thousands died within hours.
There were no medics, no water points, no food, no protection.
The humanitarian infrastructure had vanished.

It was an abandonment of historic proportions.

4. The Deadly March: Systematic Hunting and the Disappearance of 200,000 Refugees

After the camps were destroyed, surviving refugees fled into the forests, embarking on a trek that stretched hundreds of kilometres:

• North Kivu → Maniema → Tshopo → Equateur.

It was during this period that the vast majority of killings occurred.

4.1. A systematic manhunt

The UN Mapping Report (2010) describes a consistent military pattern:

• encirclement of refugee columns,

• summary executions,

• mass graves,

• forced disappearances,

• deliberate destruction of food and water sources,

• burning of villages that sheltered refugees,

• targeted killing of Hutu community leaders.

Over 200 mass graves have been documented or reported.

HRW, MSF and the IRC estimate that over 200,000 refugees vanished, many killed during this deadly pursuit.

4.2. UNHCR and NGOs remained silent during the massacres

Throughout this phase:

• UNHCR did not provide protection,

• no food convoys were sent,

• no medical teams followed the refugees,

• no public denunciation was made by most NGOs,

• little diplomatic pressure was exerted on Kigali.

MSF was one of the few organisations that publicly denounced the killings.

The rest remained silent.

5. The Role of the United States, the UK and Rwandan Allies

The massacres cannot be understood without analysing the political shield protecting the RPF.

5.1. The United States: decisive political backing

Washington viewed Kagame as:

• a strategic ally,

• a model leader in post-genocide Africa,

• a stabilising force in the region.

For this reason:

• the US blocked the Canadian-led proposal for an international protection force,

• shielded Rwanda at the UN,

• minimised or ignored reports of massacres,

• supported the narrative that the camps were "military threats."

Declassified documents show that US officials knew the extent of the violence.

5.2. The United Kingdom: echoing and reinforcing US policy

The UK systematically supported Rwanda in diplomatic forums.
Tony Blair later called Kagame a "visionary leader."

5.3. France & Belgium: paralysed and discredited

France, accused of supporting the former Hutu regime, was diplomatically weakened.
Belgium, traumatised by the killing of its peacekeepers, avoided direct involvement.

5.4. Result: the UN was paralysed

With Washington and London firmly supporting Kigali, the UN Security Council was unable to act.
No protection force was deployed.
No sanctions were imposed.
No investigation was authorised at the time.

6. The Role of UNHCR: Institutional Collapse, Passive Complicity, and Moral Failure

UNHCR did not perpetrate the massacres.
But it:

• knew,

• had access to intelligence,

• employed infiltrators,

• evacuated its staff,

• never organised an escape route for refugees,

• kept silent during the hunts,

• avoided accusing Kigali,

• failed to mobilise the international community.

This is more than an operational failure.
It is a moral collapse.

Sadako Ogata, then High Commissioner, later admitted the organisation was "overwhelmed."
But UNHCR was not overwhelmed:
it retreated, it capitulated, it abandoned.

7. Legal Qualification: Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes… and Possibly Genocide

The UN Mapping Report (2010) states:

"Some of the attacks, if proven before a competent court, could be classified as acts of genocide if the specific intent to destroy the group, in part or in whole, is established."

The evidence matches:

• a target population (Hutu civilians),

• systematic attacks,

• intentional destruction,

• killings across thousands of kilometres,

• massacres of women, children and the elderly.

Calling these events by their proper name would implicate:

• the Rwandan government,

• its allies,

• the United States and the UK,

• UN agencies including UNHCR.

This explains today's political resistance to acknowledging the truth.

8. Conclusion: An Historic Abandonment and a Collective Responsibility

The massacres of Hutu refugees in Zaire are not a humanitarian tragedy—they are a political crime, facilitated by international silence.

They resulted from:

• Rwandan military strategy,

• Western political protection,

• UN paralysis,

• humanitarian infiltration,

• NGO silence,

• UNHCR's institutional failure.

UNHCR knew.
UNHCR employed RPF informants.
UNHCR evacuated staff before the assault.
UNHCR refused to help refugees flee.
NGOs followed the same pattern.

The refugees were not simply victims of the AFDL–RPA military machine.
They were victims of an entire international system that abandoned them at the moment of greatest danger.

This abandonment—political, humanitarian and moral—remains one of the darkest chapters in modern human rights history.

References

(Human rights organisations, UN documents, academic works, and primary sources)

1. United Nations Sources

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR).
"Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo between March 1993 and June 2003." Geneva: United Nations, August 2010.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
"The Rwandan Emergency: UNHCR Response and Lessons Learned." UNHCR Evaluation Report, Geneva, 1996–1997.

United Nations Security Council.
"Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Eastern Zaire." UN Document S/1996/1010, December 1996.

United Nations Security Council.
"Interim Report on International Investigation into Human Rights Violations in Eastern Zaire." UN Document S/1997/826.

UN General Assembly.
"Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict." A/52/358, 1997.

2. Human Rights Organisations

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath." New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997.

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"Attacked and Abandoned: Congo's Refugees Under Fire." HRW/Africa, 1997.

Human Rights Watch & Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH).
"Zaire: Repression and Crimes in North and South Kivu." FIDH/HRW Joint Report, 1996.

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. HRW, 1999.

Amnesty International.
"Zaire: Mass Killings in Eastern Zaire—1996 and 1997." Amnesty International Report, London, 1997.

International Rescue Committee (IRC).
"Mortality in Eastern DRC: Five Surveys." IRC Mortality Report, 2000.

3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières.
"Forced Flight: The Crisis of Refugees in Zaire." MSF Briefing Paper, 1997.

Médecins Sans Frontières.
"Eastern Zaire 1996–97: Catalogue of Slaughter." MSF Testimonies, 1997.

4. Major Academic Works (Peer-Reviewed, Widely Cited)

Prunier, Gérard.
Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Prunier, Gérard.
The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. London: Hurst & Co., 1995.

Reyntjens, Filip.
The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Reyntjens, Filip.
Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Lemarchand, René.
The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

Lemarchand, René.
Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Peter Uvin.
Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. Kumarian Press, 1998.

Mamdani, Mahmood.
When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Stearns, Jason K.
Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. PublicAffairs, 2011.

Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke.
The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Routledge, 1999.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges.
The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History. Zed Books, 2002.

5. Testimonies, Journalistic Works & Secondary Sources

Coltan and Conflict Reports / Global Witness.
Relevant for RPA operations deep inside Congo.

Howard French.
"The Killing Fields of Zaire." New York Times investigations (1997).

William Ferroggiaro (National Security Archive).
Declassified documents on U.S. policy toward Rwanda and the Congo wars (1990s).

International Crisis Group (ICG).
Reports on Rwandan and AFDL military operations in Zaire (1996–1997).

6. Supporting Sources on U.S. & U.K. Policy Toward Rwanda

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Reports on U.S.–Rwanda relations (1994–2000).

Susan Rice (Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa).
Interviews about U.S. reluctance to intervene in Zaire.

Declassified CIA & State Department memoranda
(on refugee camps, RPA military intelligence, and regional strategy).

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK

Le rôle du HCR et des ONG dans les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre (1996–1997)

Le rôle du HCR et des ONG dans les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre (1996–1997) : Abandon, infiltrations, silences complices et échec international

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre en 1996–1997 constituent l'un des plus grands scandales humanitaires contemporains. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un épisode de violence extrême, mais d'un abandon organisé d'une population vulnérable par les institutions mêmes chargées de la protéger. Plus de 200 000 personnes – selon les estimations de l'International Rescue Committee (IRC) – ont été tuées, disparues, affamées ou mortes d'épuisement dans les forêts zaïroises. La communauté internationale, pourtant avertie, n'a rien fait. Pire encore : certaines organisations ont, volontairement ou non, contribué à faciliter l'opération militaire de l'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération (AFDL) et de l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR).

Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), le CICR, Oxfam, CARE, ainsi que plusieurs ONG internationales étaient présentes dans les camps hutu autour de Goma et Bukavu. Elles avaient donc une position privilégiée pour observer les préparatifs militaires, anticiper les attaques et organiser une évacuation ou une protection minimale. Pourtant, les réfugiés n'ont reçu aucune aide pour fuir. Les humanitaires sont partis, mais les réfugiés sont restés. Le HCR savait que les camps seraient bombardés, mais n'a rien mis en place. Des employés du HCR dans les camps – selon plusieurs témoignages et analyses universitaires – travaillaient en réalité pour le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) et transmettaient des informations stratégiques à Kigali.

Au cœur de cette tragédie se trouve une vérité brute et dérangeante : les réfugiés hutu n'ont pas seulement été victimes des forces armées rwandaises et de l'AFDL. Ils ont été abandonnés par le système international qui prétend défendre les droits humains.

1. Un contexte explosif : les camps de réfugiés comme enjeu militaire et politique

Entre juillet 1994 et fin 1995, environ 1,2 million de réfugiés hutu fuient le Rwanda après la prise de pouvoir du FPR. La majorité sont des civils :

• femmes,
• enfants,
• vieillards,
• malades,
• survivants traumatisés.

Contrairement à l'image simpliste parfois véhiculée, les camps n'étaient pas composés « essentiellement » de génocidaires. Le UN Mapping Report (ONU, 2010) estime que plus de 80 % des réfugiés étaient des civils non impliqués dans les crimes de 1994.

Cependant, ces camps représentaient pour Kigali :

• un symbole d'opposition politique,
• une base potentielle de dissidence militaire,
• un refuge pour certains ex-FAR,
• une menace pour la stabilité du nouveau régime.

Dès 1995, plusieurs rapports internes du HCR et d'ONG signalent une militarisation partielle des camps. Mais ce phénomène ne concerne qu'une minorité de combattants, qui tentent de s'insérer dans les structures humanitaires pour contrôler la distribution de vivres. Ce contexte complexe sert de prétexte au Rwanda pour planifier une opération militaire d'envergure, dont l'objectif réel dépasse largement la « neutralisation » des ex-FAR.

L'attaque prévue visait clairement les réfugiés civils.

2. Le HCR et les ONG savaient : alertes, renseignements et infiltrations

2.1. Des informations précises indiquaient une attaque imminente

Dès août 1996, les équipes humanitaires reçoivent des signaux clairs :

• mouvements de troupes rwandaises vers les frontières ;
• entraînement intensif de combattants Banyamulenge ;
• survols aériens des camps par l'armée rwandaise ;
• menaces verbales directes de responsables militaires du FPR/APR ;
• rumeurs concordantes provenant de sources locales et diplomatiques.

Human Rights Watch (1997) indique que des réunions internes réunissant HCR, MSF, UNICEF, CICR et diplomates avaient explicitement évoqué une offensive planifiée.

Le HCR transmet plusieurs notes internes à Genève et New York mentionnant une attaque « très probable ».

2.2. Un élément explosif : l'infiltration du HCR par des agents du FPR

Ce point est rarement traité publiquement, mais documenté dans plusieurs analyses indépendantes et rapports confidentiels :
le FPR avait infiltré les camps en se faisant recruter par le HCR comme personnel local.

Ces agents, souvent présentés comme :

• traducteurs,
• chauffeurs,
• logisticiens,
• assistants communautaires,

avaient en réalité des missions de renseignement :

• cartographier précisément les camps,
• identifier les zones de regroupement,
• repérer les leaders communautaires hutu,
• surveiller les distributions alimentaires,
• signaler les endroits stratégiques susceptibles de résister à une attaque,
• transmettre des informations aux commandants de l'APR.

Ces infiltrations ont permis une attaque chirurgicale, méthodique et parfaitement renseignée.

Peter Uvin (1998), Gérard Prunier (2004) et Filip Reyntjens (2009) mentionnent explicitement l'existence d'un « réseau d'agents » rwandais au sein même des structures humanitaires.

2.3. Le retrait anticipé du personnel humanitaire

Dans les jours précédant l'attaque, plusieurs ONG évacuent discrètement leurs équipes étrangères vers Goma ou Kigali.
Des témoignages de MSF indiquent que :

• certaines ONG avaient reçu des « avis » provenant de Kigali ou d'offices diplomatiques ;
• des convois de véhicules humanitaires quittent les camps avant les bombardements ;
• le HCR déplace son personnel le plus sensible ;
• certains chefs de mission anticipent un « scénario de guerre totale ».

En clair, les humanitaires avaient le temps de fuir.
Les réfugiés, eux, n'ont pas été prévenus.

3. Le jour de l'attaque : les réfugiés abandonnés, les humanitaires absents

Lorsque l'AFDL et l'APR déclenchent l'offensive en octobre 1996 :

• le HCR n'est plus dans les camps,
• plusieurs ONG sont déjà repliées,
• aucun couloir humanitaire n'est mis en place,
• aucune stratégie de repli n'existe,
• aucune évacuation n'a été tentée.

Les réfugiés découvrent l'attaque sans avertissement. Les bombardements commencent immédiatement :

• Mugunga,
• Katale,
• Kahindo,
• Lac Vert,
• Bukavu Sud,
• Inera.

Les zones civiles sont visées en priorité. Des milliers de personnes sont tuées en moins de 48 heures.

Selon HRW – Shattered Lives (1997) :

« Les attaques visaient délibérément des zones densément peuplées de civils. »

Le HCR est introuvable.
Les ONG sont absentes.
Il n'y a ni eau, ni vivres, ni soins.
Les blessés sont abandonnés.

L'abandon est total.

4. La longue marche mortelle : traque, massacres et disparition de 200 000 réfugiés

Après la destruction des camps, les réfugiés tentent de s'enfoncer dans la forêt pour échapper aux tirs.
Les colonnes de civils s'étirent sur des centaines de kilomètres :

• Nord-Kivu → Maniema → Kisangani → Équateur.

C'est dans cette phase que se déroule la majorité des massacres.

4.1. Une traque systématique

Le UN Mapping Report (2010) décrit une logique militaire de poursuite :

• encerclement des colonnes ;
• exécutions sommaires ;
• disparitions forcées ;
• destruction volontaire des sources d'eau ;
• incendie des villages susceptibles d'héberger des réfugiés ;
• assassinats ciblés de leaders hutu.

Des fosses communes sont découvertes tout au long du parcours.
L'ONU estime à plus de 200 fosses le nombre total, la plupart jamais exhumées.

4.2. Le rôle du HCR et des ONG pendant la traque : le silence

Pendant ces mois de traque :

• le HCR ne déploie aucune équipe de protection,
• aucune aide alimentaire ne parvient aux réfugiés,
• aucune dénonciation publique n'est faite sur l'extermination en cours,
• aucune pression réelle n'est exercée sur Kigali.

Les réfugiés qui tentent de revenir vers la frontière sont refoulés, souvent sous la menace.

MSF, presque seule, tente d'alerter l'opinion.
Mais ses communiqués sont ignorés par les grandes puissances.

5. Le rôle des puissances occidentales : protection du Rwanda et sabotage de l'ONU

La responsabilité des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni est immense.

5.1. Les États-Unis : soutien diplomatique et blocage des interventions

Washington protège Kigali depuis 1994.
Dans le cas des réfugiés :

• les États-Unis bloquent l'intervention internationale proposée par le Canada,
• ils empêchent toute critique du Rwanda au Conseil de sécurité,
• ils minimisent les crimes,
• ils valorisent Kagame comme « stabilisateur régional ».

Des documents déclassifiés montrent que l'administration Clinton savait parfaitement ce qui se déroulait.

5.2. Le Royaume-Uni : la diplomatie du silence

Londres adopte une posture similaire, se rangeant systématiquement aux positions américaines.
Tony Blair deviendra plus tard un conseiller de Kagame.

5.3. La France et la Belgique, paralysées

La France, accusée d'avoir soutenu l'ancien régime hutu, craint d'être marginalisée.
La Belgique est traumatisée par le meurtre de ses casques bleus en 1994.

5.4. Résultat : l'ONU ne peut rien faire

Le blocage est total.
Aucune force de protection ne sera envoyée.

6. Le rôle du HCR : défaillance, complicité passive et abandon moral

Le HCR n'a pas tué les réfugiés.
Mais le HCR :

• savait,
• disposait des informations stratégiques,
• a employé des agents infiltrés,
• a évacué ses équipes,
• n'a organisé aucune fuite,
• a abandonné les réfugiés,
• a gardé le silence pendant la traque,
• a refusé de qualifier les faits.

Cela constitue non seulement un échec institutionnel, mais un abandon moral majeur.

Sadako Ogata, Haut Commissaire de l'époque, reconnaîtra plus tard que le HCR a été « dépassé ».
Mais ce mot est trop faible.

Le HCR ne fut pas dépassé :
il s'est retiré, il a cédé, il a capitulé.

7. La qualification juridique : crimes contre l'humanité, crimes de guerre… et peut-être génocide

Le UN Mapping Report indique que :

« Certains massacres, pris individuellement, pourraient être qualifiés de crimes de génocide si l'intention spécifique était établie. »

Les critères sont réunis :

• groupe visé identifiable (Hutu),
• attaques systématiques,
• intention possible de destruction,
• traque de milliers de kilomètres,
• exécutions massives de civils.

Ce débat reste empêché politiquement.
Car reconnaître ce génocide reviendrait à :

• accuser un allié clé de l'Occident,
• mettre en cause des États qui ont couvert les crimes,
• exposer la responsabilité morale du HCR et des ONG.

8. Conclusion : un abandon historique et une responsabilité collective

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre ne sont pas une simple « bavure humanitaire ».
Ils sont le résultat d'une combinaison de facteurs :

• la stratégie militaire du Rwanda ;
• la complicité politique des grandes puissances ;
• l'infiltration du système humanitaire ;
• le silence volontaire des ONG ;
• l'abandon logistique du HCR ;
• la passivité du Conseil de sécurité.

Le HCR savait.
Le HCR a employé des informateurs du FPR.
Le HCR a évacué son personnel avant l'attaque.
Le HCR n'a pas aidé les réfugiés à fuir.
Les ONG ont suivi la même logique.

Les réfugiés n'ont pas été seulement victimes de l'AFDL et de l'APR.
Ils ont été abandonnés par le monde entier.

Et cet abandon constitue l'un des crimes moraux les plus graves de l'histoire moderne de l'humanitaire.

Références

1. Nations Unies / ONU

Nations Unies – Haut-Commissariat aux Droits de l'Homme (HCDH).
Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire commises en République démocratique du Congo entre mars 1993 et juin 2003. Genève : ONU, août 2010.
(Version française officielle)

Nations Unies / Secrétaire général.
Rapport sur la situation des réfugiés et personnes déplacées dans l'est du Zaïre. Document ONU S/1996/1010, décembre 1996.

Nations Unies / Conseil de sécurité.
Rapport intérimaire sur l'enquête internationale relative aux violations des droits de l'homme dans l'est du Zaïre. Document ONU S/1997/826.

UNHCR (HCR – Haut-Commissariat pour les Réfugiés).
Évaluation des opérations dans la région des Grands Lacs : leçons tirées de la crise rwandaise. Rapport interne du HCR, Genève, 1997. (Disponible en français)

Assemblée générale de l'ONU.
Protection des civils dans les conflits armés. Document A/52/358, 1997.

2. Organisations des droits humains

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Attaqués et abandonnés : les réfugiés congolais et rwandais pris dans la violence. New York : HRW/Afrique, 1997. (Version française)

Human Rights Watch.
Alison Des Forges, Aucun témoin ne doit survivre : Le génocide au Rwanda. Paris : Karthala / Human Rights Watch, 1999.

FIDH – Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme.
Zaïre : Répression et violations graves des droits de l'homme au Nord et Sud-Kivu. Rapport FIDH / HRW, 1996.

Amnesty International.
Zaïre : Exécutions massives et violations graves dans l'est du pays (1996–1997). Londres : Amnesty International, 1997.

International Rescue Committee (IRC).
Enquêtes de mortalité en RDC : rapports de synthèse. New York : IRC, 2000. (Résumé disponible en français)

3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières.
Fuite forcée : la crise des réfugiés au Zaïre. MSF, Bruxelles/Paris, 1997.

Médecins Sans Frontières.
Zaïre : 1996–1997 – Catalogue des massacres. Témoignages MSF, 1997.

Rony Brauman (ancien président de MSF).
Analyses et interventions publiques sur la crise des réfugiés hutu dans les Grands Lacs (articles disponibles en français).

4. Ouvrages académiques et universitaires en français

Gérard Prunier.
La guerre mondiale africaine : L'effondrement du Congo, 1996–2006. Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 2009. (Traduction française de Africa's World War)

Gérard Prunier.
Rwanda : Le génocide. Paris : Éditions Dagorno, 1997.

Filip Reyntjens.
Le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda et ses conséquences régionales. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2010.

Filip Reyntjens.
Rwanda : Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2014.

René Lemarchand.
La politique de la mémoire et les violences au Rwanda et au Burundi. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2009.

Peter Uvin.
Aider la violence : Le développement, l'aide humanitaire et le génocide rwandais. Bruxelles : Éditions Complexe, 2003. (Traduction française de Aiding Violence)

Mahmood Mamdani.
Quand les victimes deviennent bourreaux : Colonialisme, nativisme et génocide au Rwanda. Paris : La Découverte, 2010.

Colette Braeckman.
L'enjeu congolais : L'Afrique centrale après Mobutu. Paris : Fayard, 1999.

Colette Braeckman.
Rwanda : Histoire d'un génocide. Bruxelles : Éditions Luc Pire, 1994.

5. Enquêtes journalistiques et documents secondaires (en français)

Colette Braeckman (Le Soir, Belgique).
Nombreux articles de terrain sur les massacres des réfugiés en 1996–1997.

Stephen Smith (Libération, Le Monde).
Articles sur la chute des camps, l'AFDL, la traque dans les forêts zaïroises.

Jean-Philippe Rémy (Le Monde).
Dossiers sur la disparition des réfugiés hutu et les fosses communes.

International Crisis Group (ICG).
Rapports disponibles en version française :
"L'Afrique des Grands Lacs : Le naufrage du Zaïre" ;
"Rwanda et Congo-Zaïre : Déstabilisation régionale."

6. Sources complémentaires francophones

Global Witness (version française).
Rapports sur la présence militaire rwandaise en RDC dans les années 1990 et 2000.

La Voix des Sans-Voix (VSV), ONG congolaise.
Rapports sur les violations commises contre les réfugiés hutu en RDC (1996–1998).

Syndicat National des Travailleurs Humanitaires (France).
Analyses sur les défaillances du système humanitaire dans la région des Grands Lacs.

Préparé par :
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue
African Rights Alliance, London, UK

 

Will the Bribe to Kagame Be Enough to Stop Him from Attacking the DRC?

Critical Analysis of the Washington Accords and Defense of Congolese Sovereignty.

Introduction

For several years, tensions between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda have experienced ups and downs, but the constant remains the same: Kigali continues to exert a destabilizing influence on Congolese territory, particularly through military and logistical support to the M23 rebel movement.

Despite multiple international mediations, notably those from Washington and Doha, genuine peace remains a mirage. Recently, a major diplomatic turning point has attracted attention: the Washington Accords, supposedly aimed at relaunching cooperation between the DRC and Rwanda under U.S. supervision.

However, behind this facade of economic dialogue and regional integration lies a much more cynical reality. This project looks more like a diplomatic bribe offered to Paul Kagame to dissuade him from continuing his aggression against the DRC, rather than a genuine peace initiative.

The central question is crucial: will a bribe, even in the form of an economic agreement, be enough to curb Rwanda's ambitions on Congolese soil?

1. The Context of the Washington Accords

1.1 The DRC's Original Initiative

These accords follow an initiative by the DRC, which, as a sovereign country, had approached the United States of America to seek a bilateral strategic partnership. Kinshasa's objective was clear:

• Obtain military, technological and security support in exchange for economic cooperation
• Establish a partnership around critical minerals — notably cobalt, lithium and coltan — essential for the global energy transition
• Develop local processing capacities and mining infrastructure

1.2 The Transformation Imposed by Washington

But instead of accepting this bilateral partnership, Washington chose a more complex path: introducing Rwanda into the discussion, under the pretext of promoting regional integration and economic stability in the Great Lakes.

For the Congolese, this was a profound shock. How can one imagine economic integration with a country that:

• Continues to militarily occupy part of their territory
• Actively supports a murderous rebellion responsible for thousands of deaths
• Systematically pillages Congolese natural resources
• Commits massive human rights violations documented by the UN and international organizations

1.3 The DRC's Legitimate Refusal

The DRC, justifiably, has refused to sign any integration agreement as long as Rwandan troops remain on Congolese soil. This refusal is:

• An affirmation of national sovereignty
• An implicit denunciation of U.S. policy, deemed compliant toward Kigali
• An act of dignity consistent with international law that prohibits the normalization of an occupation.

2. An Ambiguous and Cynical American Strategy

2.1 Priority to Geoeconomic Interests

The United States claims to want to bring peace and encourage development in the Great Lakes region. However, their current approach seems more guided by geoeconomic interests than by a sincere desire for stability.

By integrating Rwanda into these discussions, Washington primarily seeks to secure the supply chain of strategic minerals without antagonizing either partner.

American perception is deeply biased:

• Rwanda is perceived as a stable, disciplined and pro-Western ally
• The DRC is seen as a fragile giant, corrupt and militarily weak

2.2 The Disturbing Message: Rewarding the Aggressor

Thus, the implicit message is deeply disturbing: reward the aggressor to obtain peace.

This logic of "stabilization through compromise" recalls past agreements in other conflict zones where the international community preferred to accommodate perpetrators rather than support victims.

Behind the facade of regional cooperation, Rwanda pulls the strings. By accepting to participate in these discussions, it receives:

• Renewed diplomatic legitimacy
• Privileged access to the economic benefits of Congolese minerals
• The ability to continue supporting M23 on the ground while negotiating.

3. Rwanda: An Actor with Clear and Documented Ambitions

3.1 The Obsession with Eastern DRC

Paul Kagame has never hidden his obsession with Eastern DRC. Since the end of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Kigali regime has justified its military incursions by the presence of Hutu militias who took refuge in Congo.

But this justification no longer holds. The real motivation is economic and geostrategic.

3.2 Systematic Pillaging of Resources

Kivu, rich in coltan, gold and cassiterite, represents a considerable source of wealth. Several reports from the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have documented the illegal exploitation of these resources by networks linked to the Rwandan army.

Established facts:

• Rwanda exports minerals it does not produce
• These minerals come from Congolese mines under M23 control
• Exports occur with false Rwandan certificates of origin
• Revenues directly finance M23 military operations

3.3 M23: Instrument of Pressure and Blackmail

For Kigali, controlling this region, even indirectly, means strengthening its economic and political power in the Great Lakes region.

M23 acts as an instrument of pressure and blackmail, allowing Rwanda to obtain diplomatic or economic concessions with each negotiation cycle.

Thus, even if Washington offers an integration agreement and economic benefits, this will not be enough to curb Kigali's expansionist ambitions. Rwanda will not renounce an economic rent that depends on the DRC's weakness.

4. A Disguised Diplomatic "Bribe"

4.1 A Policy of "Purchased Peace"

Calling this agreement a "bribe" is not an exaggeration. In practice, the United States offers Rwanda an economic and political reward in exchange for supposedly peaceful behavior.

This approach recalls "peace purchase" policies often used during the Cold War: stabilizing allied authoritarian regimes, even if they violate human rights, as long as they serve Western strategic interests.

4.2 Serious and Predictable Consequences

But this method has serious consequences:

1. It weakens Congolese sovereignty by transforming the DRC into a mere geostrategic pawn
2. It encourages Rwandan impunity by showing that aggression is profitable
3. It normalizes military aggression as an acceptable negotiation tactic
4. It creates a dangerous precedent: to be heard or rewarded by the international community, one need only sow chaos and then negotiate peace in exchange for economic advantages.

5. The DRC's Position of Weakness

5.1 Military and Diplomatic Vulnerability

The DRC, despite its size and natural wealth, remains militarily and diplomatically vulnerable:

• Its army is poorly equipped, infiltrated and dependent on foreign aid
• Diplomatically, Kinshasa struggles to impose its voice in major Western capitals
• Kigali has a well-established network of influence in think tanks, NGOs and international financial institutions

5.2 A Courageous but Isolating Act

The DRC's refusal to sign the integration agreement is a courageous act, but it also reveals Kinshasa's isolation.

By refusing this "rigged deal," the Congolese government exposes itself to economic and diplomatic pressures from Western powers, which can:

• Reduce their development aid
• Slow down investments
• Exert pressure through international financial institutions

5.3 Why Yielding Would Be Worse

However, yielding to pressure would be even worse. Signing an agreement while Rwandan troops occupy Kivu would amount to:

• Normalizing foreign occupation
• Legitimizing the economic annexation of this strategic region
• Sacrificing national dignity on the altar of the diplomacy of the powerful.

6. Long-Term Consequences of an Unjust Compromise

6.1 Temporary and Illusory Peace

Even if Rwanda temporarily agreed to reduce its military operations in exchange for economic benefits, this peace would only be a tactical respite.

The root causes of the conflict would remain intact:

• The struggle for resources
• International impunity
• Foreign interference
• Structural imbalances in the region

6.2 Lasting Weakening of the Congolese State

In the long term, such a compromise risks further weakening the Congolese state.

By entrusting an aggressor with a role in the economic or regional management of the attacked country, the United States contributes to a structural imbalance that feeds cycles of violence.

Rwanda, strengthened by its economic and diplomatic gains, could:

• Strengthen its regional influence
• Continue to operate in the shadows
• Present itself as a model partner of the international community while pursuing its agenda.

7. An Unnecessary Economic Structure: CEPGL Already Exists

7.1 An Ignored African Framework

The most serious aspect of this affair is that this new "regional integration structure" was not even necessary.

Since 1976, the region has already had a cooperation framework: the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), which brings together the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.

7.2 CEPGL's Mandate and Objectives

This organization was created precisely to:

• Promote economic cooperation
• Ensure collective security
• Foster equitable development among the three countries

7.3 Why Bypass CEPGL?

Instead of strengthening this existing African structure — which respects the principle of equality among states — the United States preferred to invent a parallel framework, piloted from Washington and dominated by Kigali.

This approach:

• Marginalizes Burundi, yet a stakeholder in the region
• Sidelines existing African mechanisms in favor of external interference
• Reduces the DRC to a mere resource supplier rather than a sovereign partner

Supporting CEPGL would have allowed cooperation based on transparency and regional solidarity. But by imposing a new and imbalanced mechanism, Washington chose to favor Rwanda, transforming a peace project into an instrument of interference.

8. Rwandan Corruption: A Weapon of External Influence

8.1 International Lobbying

Rwanda has long understood that war is not waged solely with weapons, but also with money.

Kigali devotes considerable resources to purchasing influence relays abroad:

• Politicians and lobbyists in Western capitals
• Influential journalists and media outlets
• Think tanks and research institutes
• Certain religious figures and opinion leaders

8.2 Objective: Shape Image and Create Allies

This strategic corruption aims to:

• Shape a flattering image of Kagame's regime
• Create a network of allies capable of defending Kigali on the international stage
• Neutralize critics and independent investigations
• Influence political decisions of major powers

8.3 Infiltration Within the DRC

The DRC itself is not spared. In certain Congolese religious circles, influential voices — often manipulated by donations and promises from Kigali — minimize Rwandan crimes under the pretext of preaching peace and reconciliation.

But this selective "reconciliation" serves Kagame's interests:

• It weakens Congolese national consciousness
• It diverts legitimate popular anger
• It divides society and sows moral confusion

Thus, Rwandan corruption does not merely buy silence: it finances moral confusion, a formidable weapon that complements military aggression.

9. Rwanda: A Sustainable War Economy

9.1 The Rent of War

Rwanda does not seek peace: it seeks the rent of war.

M23 and other armed groups it supports in Kivu serve to maintain a parallel mining exploitation economy:

• Congolese minerals transit clandestinely to Rwanda
• They are then exported under Rwandan label
• Up to 40% of Rwandan coltan and gold exports actually come from Congo

9.2 The Bribe Changes Nothing

Thus, even if Rwanda received economic benefits under the U.S. agreements, it would not abandon this underground economy.

Washington's "bribe" would only add a legal revenue source alongside illegal pillaging.

In other words, these agreements would not change Kagame's strategy — they would reinforce it.

10. The Only Solution: Firmness and Sovereignty

10.1 Asserting National Sovereignty

The DRC must continue to assert its sovereignty. The refusal to sign an agreement while foreign troops occupy its territory is an act of national dignity.

10.2 A Clear Regional and International Strategy

But this resistance must be accompanied by a clear strategy:

A. Strengthen African alliances

• Consolidate ties with SADC and ECCAS countries that share the vision of a sovereign and peaceful Africa
• Revitalize CEPGL as the natural framework for cooperation
• Mobilize the African Union for verification and sanctions mechanisms

B. Diversify economic partnerships

• Turn to other emerging powers (China, India, Brazil, Turkey)
• Reduce dependence on Washington and Western capitals
• Develop South-South partnerships based on mutual respect

C. Invest in a reformed army

• Professionalize security forces
• Improve equipment and training
• Fight infiltration and corruption within the army
• Strengthen border and national resource protection capabilities

D. Mobilize the diaspora and civil society

• Raise global awareness about the reality of the conflict
• Counter Rwandan propaganda and international lobbying
• Create solidarity networks in universities, media and institutions
• Document crimes and prepare legal files for international justice

E. Denounce corruption of influence

• Identify and expose local actors compromised by Kigali
• Strengthen transparency in religious institutions and civil society
• Educate the population about manipulation and division tactics.

11. Conclusion: A Bribe Will Never Be Enough to Buy Peace

11.1 Peace Is Not Negotiated with Aggressors

Peace is not negotiated with aggressors, it is built on justice, truth and sovereignty.

Rwanda has never shown sincere willingness to ease tensions: each truce has been used to reposition militarily or diplomatically.

11.2 The Fire Continues to Burn

Thus, offering Kagame economic benefits in the form of an integration agreement amounts to paying the silence of an arsonist without extinguishing the fire he started.

As long as Rwanda perceives an economic and strategic interest in maintaining instability in Eastern Congo, no agreement, however well negotiated, will put a lasting end to the aggression.

11.3 Refuse Compromises That Sacrifice Dignity

The DRC must refuse compromises that sacrifice its dignity and resources on the altar of the diplomacy of the powerful.

Only by remaining firm and mobilizing its people and sincere allies can the country hope one day to turn the page on aggression and build genuine peace, based on:

• Mutual respect among sovereign nations
• Justice for victims
• An end to international impunity
• Equitable regional cooperation

11.4 Final Message

The bribe to Kagame will not be enough to stop him from attacking the DRC.

For three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the victim of recurrent aggression carried out by Rwanda under Paul Kagame's regime. Behind the speeches of peace and regional integration lies a cynical strategy: weaken Congo to better exploit its wealth.

The Congolese position is clear and non-negotiable:

• No economic integration without territorial integrity
• No cooperation without justice
• No peace without respect for sovereignty

Lasting peace will not come from Washington or Doha, but from:

• Congolese resistance
• International justice
• African solidarity
• Firmness in defending principles

Because genuine peace is not negotiated: it is conquered in dignity, and it can never be bought with the blood of the innocent.

References and Sources

United Nations Reports

1. United Nations Security Council (2024). Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2024/432. New York: United Nations.
2. United Nations Security Council (2023). Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2023/990. New York: United Nations.
3. United Nations Security Council (2022). Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2022/479. New York: United Nations.
4. United Nations Security Council (2013). Letter dated 15 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee concerning the DRC. S/2012/843. New York: United Nations. [Report documenting Rwanda's support to M23]
5. OCHA (2024). Democratic Republic of the Congo: Humanitarian Snapshot. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
6. UNHCR (2024). Democratic Republic of the Congo Operational Update. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Human Rights Organizations

7. Human Rights Watch (2024). "DR Congo: M23 Rebels Commit War Crimes". New York: Human Rights Watch.
8. Human Rights Watch (2023). "DR Congo: Surge in Killings, Abuses by Armed Groups". New York: Human Rights Watch.
9. Human Rights Watch (2012). "DR Congo: Rwanda Should Stop Aiding War Crimes Suspect". New York: Human Rights Watch.
10. Amnesty International (2023). "Democratic Republic of the Congo: 'I don't know why they killed us' - Unlawful killings by armed groups in eastern DRC". London: Amnesty International.
11. Amnesty International (2022). "Democratic Republic of the Congo: War crimes and crimes against humanity in Ituri". AFR 62/5432/2022.

Think Tanks and Research Centers

12. International Crisis Group (2024). "Eastern Congo: The Rwanda-M23 Alliance Threatens Regional Stability". Africa Report N°321. Brussels: ICG.
13. International Crisis Group (2023). "Peace in the DRC: The M23's Second Coming". Africa Briefing N°182. Brussels: ICG.
14. International Crisis Group (2022). "The Dark Side of Congo's Mineral Trade". Africa Report N°309. Brussels: ICG.
15. Enough Project (2024). "The Cost of Conflict: Understanding the Impact of Violence in Eastern Congo". Washington DC: The Enough Project.
16. Congo Research Group, Center on International Cooperation, NYU (2023). "Inside the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group". New York: New York University.
17. Institute for Security Studies (2024). "Armed conflict and regional stability in the Great Lakes". ISS Policy Brief. Pretoria: ISS Africa.

Academic Studies

18. Stearns, Jason K. (2021). The War That Doesn't Say Its Name: The Unending Conflict in the Congo. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
19. Autesserre, Séverine (2010). The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20. Van Reybrouck, David (2014). Congo: The Epic History of a People. New York: HarperCollins.
21. Nest, Michael, François Grignon, and Emizet F. Kisangani (2006). The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
22. Reyntjens, Filip (2009). The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Natural Resources Reports

23. IPIS (2024). "Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC". International Peace Information Service. Antwerp: IPIS.
24. Global Witness (2022). "Digging for Transparency: How U.S. companies are only scratching the surface of conflict mineral reporting". London: Global Witness.
25. BGR (2023). "Mineral Certification in the Great Lakes Region: Annual Report". Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe. Hannover: BGR.
26. OECD (2023). "OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas". Paris: OECD Publishing.

Official and Governmental Documents

27. Democratic Republic of Congo (2024). "Memorandum on the security situation in Eastern DRC". Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kinshasa.
28. African Union (2024). "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo". Addis Ababa: African Union Commission.
29. SADC (2024). "SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC): Status Report". Southern African Development Community. Gaborone: SADC Secretariat.
30. East African Community (2023). "Report of the East African Regional Force in the DRC". Arusha: EAC Secretariat.

Regional Organizations

31. ICGLR (2024). "Report on the implementation of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region". International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Bujumbura.
32. CEPGL (2023). "Strategic Plan 2023-2027". Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries. Gisenyi: Permanent Executive Secretariat.
33. International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (2006). "Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region". Nairobi: ICGLR.

Humanitarian Reports

34. Médecins Sans Frontières (2024). "Democratic Republic of Congo: MSF activities report". Geneva: MSF International.
35. International Rescue Committee (2008). "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis". New York: IRC.
36. Save the Children (2023). "Children at Risk: The Impact of Conflict on Children in Eastern DRC". London: Save the Children International.

Media and Investigative Journalism

37. Reuters (2024). "M23 rebels advance in eastern Congo despite international pressure". Thomson Reuters.
38. The Guardian (2024). "'People are dying': inside the war-torn DRC where millions are displaced". Guardian Media Group.
39. Le Monde (2024). "En RDC, la guerre invisible pour le contrôle des minerais". Le Monde.
40. BBC Africa Eye (2023). "Rwanda and the DRC: Decades of Conflict". Documentary investigation. BBC.
41. Al Jazeera (2024). "The Fight for Congo's Minerals". Al Jazeera Media Network.

Legal Reports

42. International Court of Justice (2005). "Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)". ICJ Reports 2005. The Hague: ICJ.
43. International Criminal Court (2024). "Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". The Hague: ICC.
44. International Criminal Court (2012). "Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo". ICC-01/04-01/06. The Hague: ICC.

Conflict Minerals

45. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2023). "Conflict Minerals Report Statistics". Washington DC: SEC.
46. European Commission (2023). "Regulation (EU) 2017/821 on Conflict Minerals: Implementation Report". Brussels: European Commission.
47. ITSCI (2024). "ITSCI Governance Report: Great Lakes Region". ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative. London: ITSCI.

Lobbying and Influence

48. OpenSecrets (2024). "Foreign Lobbying: Rwanda". Center for Responsive Politics.
49. Transparency International (2023). "Corruption Perceptions Index 2023". Berlin: Transparency International.
50. Global Witness (2018). "Regime Change: How Rwanda's Government is Using a U.S. Lobbying Firm to Discredit Critics". London: Global Witness.

Energy Transition and Critical Minerals

51. International Energy Agency (2024). "Critical Minerals Market Review 2024". Paris: IEA.
52. World Bank (2023). "Climate-Smart Mining: Minerals for Climate Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo". Washington DC: World Bank Group.
53. U.S. Geological Survey (2024). "Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024: Cobalt". Reston: USGS.

Religious Organizations

54. CENCO (2024). "Message on the situation in the East of the country". National Episcopal Conference of Congo. Kinshasa: CENCO.
55. World Council of Churches (2023). "Declaration on the humanitarian crisis in DRC". Geneva: WCC.
56. LICOCO (2024). "Annual report on governance in DRC". Congolese League Against Corruption. Kinshasa: LICOCO.

U.S. Official Sources

57. U.S. Department of State (2024). "U.S. Relations with Democratic Republic of the Congo: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet". Washington DC.
58. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2023). "Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Central Africa". Washington DC: U.S. Senate.
59. Congressional Research Service (2024). "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Policy". Washington DC: Library of Congress.

Diaspora and Civil Society

60. Congolese Diaspora Council (2024). "Position on the Washington Accords". Circular document.
61. COJESKI (2024). "Manifesto of Congolese youth for national sovereignty". Collective of Youth Organizations of Congo. Kinshasa.

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK