The Role of UNHCR and International NGOs in the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in Zaire (1996–1997)

The Role of UNHCR and International NGOs in the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in Zaire (1996–1997): Abandonment, Infiltration, Complicity and Humanitarian Failure

The massacres of Hutu refugees in Zaire in 1996–1997 constitute one of the greatest humanitarian scandals of the late twentieth century. It is not merely an episode of extreme violence: it is the story of an abandonment organised and tolerated by the very institutions mandated to protect vulnerable populations. More than 200,000 refugees—according to the International Rescue Committee (IRC)—were killed, disappeared, starved, or died of exhaustion in the Congolese forests. The international community, fully aware of what was coming, did nothing. Worse still, several organisations facilitated, knowingly or unknowingly, the military operations of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the ICRC, Oxfam, CARE and other NGOs were present in the massive Hutu refugee camps near Goma and Bukavu. They were in a unique position to observe the military build-up, anticipate the attacks, and organise even a minimal evacuation or protection effort. Yet no assistance was ever provided to help the refugees flee, even when the dangers were known. Humanitarian personnel left; refugees stayed behind. UNHCR knew the camps would be bombed, but no alternative plan was developed. Worse still, multiple testimonies and analyses indicate that UNHCR employed local staff secretly affiliated with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—individuals who gathered and transmitted intelligence directly to Kigali.

At the heart of this tragedy lies an undeniable truth: Hutu refugees were not only victims of the AFDL and the RPA; they were abandoned by the international system that claimed to protect human rights.

1. An Explosive Context: Refugee Camps as Military and Political Targets

Between July 1994 and 1995, roughly 1.2 million Hutu refugees fled Rwanda following the RPF's victory. The vast majority were civilians:

• women,

• children,

• elderly and sick people,

• traumatised survivors.

Contrary to simplistic narratives, the refugee camps were not "mostly genocidaires." The UN Mapping Report (UN OHCHR, 2010) estimated that over 80% of refugees were civilians uninvolved in the 1994 massacres.

However, these camps represented for the new Rwandan government:

• a political threat,

• a potential base for opposition,

• a refuge for some former FAR officers,

• and an obstacle to the RPF's regional and domestic plans.

As early as 1995, UNHCR internal reports and documents from MSF, Oxfam and CARE described limited militarisation within the camps. A small number of former soldiers attempted to influence food distribution or intimidate refugees. But these conditions did not justify the destruction of entire civilian camps.

The RPF used this as a pretext to prepare a full-scale military offensive whose real objective was far broader than neutralising armed elements. The operation aimed at dismantling the camps entirely, pushing back the population, and eliminating what Kigali perceived as the remnants of a demographic and political threat.

2. UNHCR and NGOs Knew: Warnings, Intelligence, and Infiltration

2.1. Clear warnings of an imminent attack

By August 1996, humanitarian actors had received consistent warnings:

• Rwandan troop movements near the Zaire border,

• rapid training of Banyamulenge troops,

• aerial surveillance of the camps,

• explicit threats issued by RPF officials,

• intelligence from local sources and diplomatic missions.

Human Rights Watch (1997) documents several internal meetings where UNHCR, MSF, UNICEF, ICRC and diplomats discussed a likely RPA attack. UNHCR sent cables to Geneva and New York highlighting a "very high probability" of military intervention.

2.2. Explosive fact: UNHCR employed RPF infiltrators inside the camps

Several independent analyses, testimonies and academic sources indicate that the RPF had infiltrated the humanitarian system inside the camps.
UNHCR—often unknowingly—employed:

• interpreters,

• drivers,

• logisticians,

• community outreach workers

who were, in fact, RPF agents.

Their duties included:

• mapping the camps,

• identifying civilian concentrations,

• locating community leaders,

• monitoring food or health distribution points,

• reporting strategic information directly to RPA commanders.

This covert infiltration provided Kigali with exceptionally precise intelligence, making the coming assault highly efficient.

Researchers such as Peter Uvin (1998), Gérard Prunier (2004), and Filip Reyntjens (2009) have confirmed the existence of these networks of RPF informants.

2.3. Humanitarian withdrawal before the attack

In the days preceding the assault, multiple NGOs quietly evacuated their personnel to Goma or even Kigali.
Testimonies collected by MSF reveal that:

• some NGOs had been "informally warned" to withdraw,

• convoys of expatriates left before the bombardments,

• UNHCR relocated key staff,

• humanitarian leadership anticipated a worst-case scenario.

In short:
humanitarians had time to save themselves, but not the refugees.

3. When the Attack Began: Refugees Abandoned, Humanitarians Nowhere to Be Seen

When the AFDL–RPA launched the offensive in October 1996:

• UNHCR staff had evacuated,

• several major NGOs were no longer present,

• no humanitarian corridor existed,

• no relocation plan had been prepared,

• no effort was made to inform the refugees of the impending danger.

The refugees were caught off-guard. Bombardments targeted civilian areas:

• Mugunga,

• Katale,

• Kahindo,

• Lac Vert,

• Bukavu South,

• Inera.

Human Rights Watch (Shattered Lives, 1997) noted:

"The attacks deliberately targeted densely populated civilian zones."

Thousands died within hours.
There were no medics, no water points, no food, no protection.
The humanitarian infrastructure had vanished.

It was an abandonment of historic proportions.

4. The Deadly March: Systematic Hunting and the Disappearance of 200,000 Refugees

After the camps were destroyed, surviving refugees fled into the forests, embarking on a trek that stretched hundreds of kilometres:

• North Kivu → Maniema → Tshopo → Equateur.

It was during this period that the vast majority of killings occurred.

4.1. A systematic manhunt

The UN Mapping Report (2010) describes a consistent military pattern:

• encirclement of refugee columns,

• summary executions,

• mass graves,

• forced disappearances,

• deliberate destruction of food and water sources,

• burning of villages that sheltered refugees,

• targeted killing of Hutu community leaders.

Over 200 mass graves have been documented or reported.

HRW, MSF and the IRC estimate that over 200,000 refugees vanished, many killed during this deadly pursuit.

4.2. UNHCR and NGOs remained silent during the massacres

Throughout this phase:

• UNHCR did not provide protection,

• no food convoys were sent,

• no medical teams followed the refugees,

• no public denunciation was made by most NGOs,

• little diplomatic pressure was exerted on Kigali.

MSF was one of the few organisations that publicly denounced the killings.

The rest remained silent.

5. The Role of the United States, the UK and Rwandan Allies

The massacres cannot be understood without analysing the political shield protecting the RPF.

5.1. The United States: decisive political backing

Washington viewed Kagame as:

• a strategic ally,

• a model leader in post-genocide Africa,

• a stabilising force in the region.

For this reason:

• the US blocked the Canadian-led proposal for an international protection force,

• shielded Rwanda at the UN,

• minimised or ignored reports of massacres,

• supported the narrative that the camps were "military threats."

Declassified documents show that US officials knew the extent of the violence.

5.2. The United Kingdom: echoing and reinforcing US policy

The UK systematically supported Rwanda in diplomatic forums.
Tony Blair later called Kagame a "visionary leader."

5.3. France & Belgium: paralysed and discredited

France, accused of supporting the former Hutu regime, was diplomatically weakened.
Belgium, traumatised by the killing of its peacekeepers, avoided direct involvement.

5.4. Result: the UN was paralysed

With Washington and London firmly supporting Kigali, the UN Security Council was unable to act.
No protection force was deployed.
No sanctions were imposed.
No investigation was authorised at the time.

6. The Role of UNHCR: Institutional Collapse, Passive Complicity, and Moral Failure

UNHCR did not perpetrate the massacres.
But it:

• knew,

• had access to intelligence,

• employed infiltrators,

• evacuated its staff,

• never organised an escape route for refugees,

• kept silent during the hunts,

• avoided accusing Kigali,

• failed to mobilise the international community.

This is more than an operational failure.
It is a moral collapse.

Sadako Ogata, then High Commissioner, later admitted the organisation was "overwhelmed."
But UNHCR was not overwhelmed:
it retreated, it capitulated, it abandoned.

7. Legal Qualification: Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes… and Possibly Genocide

The UN Mapping Report (2010) states:

"Some of the attacks, if proven before a competent court, could be classified as acts of genocide if the specific intent to destroy the group, in part or in whole, is established."

The evidence matches:

• a target population (Hutu civilians),

• systematic attacks,

• intentional destruction,

• killings across thousands of kilometres,

• massacres of women, children and the elderly.

Calling these events by their proper name would implicate:

• the Rwandan government,

• its allies,

• the United States and the UK,

• UN agencies including UNHCR.

This explains today's political resistance to acknowledging the truth.

8. Conclusion: An Historic Abandonment and a Collective Responsibility

The massacres of Hutu refugees in Zaire are not a humanitarian tragedy—they are a political crime, facilitated by international silence.

They resulted from:

• Rwandan military strategy,

• Western political protection,

• UN paralysis,

• humanitarian infiltration,

• NGO silence,

• UNHCR's institutional failure.

UNHCR knew.
UNHCR employed RPF informants.
UNHCR evacuated staff before the assault.
UNHCR refused to help refugees flee.
NGOs followed the same pattern.

The refugees were not simply victims of the AFDL–RPA military machine.
They were victims of an entire international system that abandoned them at the moment of greatest danger.

This abandonment—political, humanitarian and moral—remains one of the darkest chapters in modern human rights history.

References

(Human rights organisations, UN documents, academic works, and primary sources)

1. United Nations Sources

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR).
"Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo between March 1993 and June 2003." Geneva: United Nations, August 2010.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
"The Rwandan Emergency: UNHCR Response and Lessons Learned." UNHCR Evaluation Report, Geneva, 1996–1997.

United Nations Security Council.
"Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Eastern Zaire." UN Document S/1996/1010, December 1996.

United Nations Security Council.
"Interim Report on International Investigation into Human Rights Violations in Eastern Zaire." UN Document S/1997/826.

UN General Assembly.
"Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict." A/52/358, 1997.

2. Human Rights Organisations

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath." New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997.

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"Attacked and Abandoned: Congo's Refugees Under Fire." HRW/Africa, 1997.

Human Rights Watch & Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH).
"Zaire: Repression and Crimes in North and South Kivu." FIDH/HRW Joint Report, 1996.

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. HRW, 1999.

Amnesty International.
"Zaire: Mass Killings in Eastern Zaire—1996 and 1997." Amnesty International Report, London, 1997.

International Rescue Committee (IRC).
"Mortality in Eastern DRC: Five Surveys." IRC Mortality Report, 2000.

3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières.
"Forced Flight: The Crisis of Refugees in Zaire." MSF Briefing Paper, 1997.

Médecins Sans Frontières.
"Eastern Zaire 1996–97: Catalogue of Slaughter." MSF Testimonies, 1997.

4. Major Academic Works (Peer-Reviewed, Widely Cited)

Prunier, Gérard.
Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Prunier, Gérard.
The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. London: Hurst & Co., 1995.

Reyntjens, Filip.
The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Reyntjens, Filip.
Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Lemarchand, René.
The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

Lemarchand, René.
Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Peter Uvin.
Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. Kumarian Press, 1998.

Mamdani, Mahmood.
When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Stearns, Jason K.
Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. PublicAffairs, 2011.

Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke.
The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Routledge, 1999.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges.
The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History. Zed Books, 2002.

5. Testimonies, Journalistic Works & Secondary Sources

Coltan and Conflict Reports / Global Witness.
Relevant for RPA operations deep inside Congo.

Howard French.
"The Killing Fields of Zaire." New York Times investigations (1997).

William Ferroggiaro (National Security Archive).
Declassified documents on U.S. policy toward Rwanda and the Congo wars (1990s).

International Crisis Group (ICG).
Reports on Rwandan and AFDL military operations in Zaire (1996–1997).

6. Supporting Sources on U.S. & U.K. Policy Toward Rwanda

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Reports on U.S.–Rwanda relations (1994–2000).

Susan Rice (Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa).
Interviews about U.S. reluctance to intervene in Zaire.

Declassified CIA & State Department memoranda
(on refugee camps, RPA military intelligence, and regional strategy).

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK

Le rôle du HCR et des ONG dans les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre (1996–1997)

Le rôle du HCR et des ONG dans les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre (1996–1997) : Abandon, infiltrations, silences complices et échec international

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre en 1996–1997 constituent l'un des plus grands scandales humanitaires contemporains. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un épisode de violence extrême, mais d'un abandon organisé d'une population vulnérable par les institutions mêmes chargées de la protéger. Plus de 200 000 personnes – selon les estimations de l'International Rescue Committee (IRC) – ont été tuées, disparues, affamées ou mortes d'épuisement dans les forêts zaïroises. La communauté internationale, pourtant avertie, n'a rien fait. Pire encore : certaines organisations ont, volontairement ou non, contribué à faciliter l'opération militaire de l'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération (AFDL) et de l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR).

Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), le CICR, Oxfam, CARE, ainsi que plusieurs ONG internationales étaient présentes dans les camps hutu autour de Goma et Bukavu. Elles avaient donc une position privilégiée pour observer les préparatifs militaires, anticiper les attaques et organiser une évacuation ou une protection minimale. Pourtant, les réfugiés n'ont reçu aucune aide pour fuir. Les humanitaires sont partis, mais les réfugiés sont restés. Le HCR savait que les camps seraient bombardés, mais n'a rien mis en place. Des employés du HCR dans les camps – selon plusieurs témoignages et analyses universitaires – travaillaient en réalité pour le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) et transmettaient des informations stratégiques à Kigali.

Au cœur de cette tragédie se trouve une vérité brute et dérangeante : les réfugiés hutu n'ont pas seulement été victimes des forces armées rwandaises et de l'AFDL. Ils ont été abandonnés par le système international qui prétend défendre les droits humains.

1. Un contexte explosif : les camps de réfugiés comme enjeu militaire et politique

Entre juillet 1994 et fin 1995, environ 1,2 million de réfugiés hutu fuient le Rwanda après la prise de pouvoir du FPR. La majorité sont des civils :

• femmes,
• enfants,
• vieillards,
• malades,
• survivants traumatisés.

Contrairement à l'image simpliste parfois véhiculée, les camps n'étaient pas composés « essentiellement » de génocidaires. Le UN Mapping Report (ONU, 2010) estime que plus de 80 % des réfugiés étaient des civils non impliqués dans les crimes de 1994.

Cependant, ces camps représentaient pour Kigali :

• un symbole d'opposition politique,
• une base potentielle de dissidence militaire,
• un refuge pour certains ex-FAR,
• une menace pour la stabilité du nouveau régime.

Dès 1995, plusieurs rapports internes du HCR et d'ONG signalent une militarisation partielle des camps. Mais ce phénomène ne concerne qu'une minorité de combattants, qui tentent de s'insérer dans les structures humanitaires pour contrôler la distribution de vivres. Ce contexte complexe sert de prétexte au Rwanda pour planifier une opération militaire d'envergure, dont l'objectif réel dépasse largement la « neutralisation » des ex-FAR.

L'attaque prévue visait clairement les réfugiés civils.

2. Le HCR et les ONG savaient : alertes, renseignements et infiltrations

2.1. Des informations précises indiquaient une attaque imminente

Dès août 1996, les équipes humanitaires reçoivent des signaux clairs :

• mouvements de troupes rwandaises vers les frontières ;
• entraînement intensif de combattants Banyamulenge ;
• survols aériens des camps par l'armée rwandaise ;
• menaces verbales directes de responsables militaires du FPR/APR ;
• rumeurs concordantes provenant de sources locales et diplomatiques.

Human Rights Watch (1997) indique que des réunions internes réunissant HCR, MSF, UNICEF, CICR et diplomates avaient explicitement évoqué une offensive planifiée.

Le HCR transmet plusieurs notes internes à Genève et New York mentionnant une attaque « très probable ».

2.2. Un élément explosif : l'infiltration du HCR par des agents du FPR

Ce point est rarement traité publiquement, mais documenté dans plusieurs analyses indépendantes et rapports confidentiels :
le FPR avait infiltré les camps en se faisant recruter par le HCR comme personnel local.

Ces agents, souvent présentés comme :

• traducteurs,
• chauffeurs,
• logisticiens,
• assistants communautaires,

avaient en réalité des missions de renseignement :

• cartographier précisément les camps,
• identifier les zones de regroupement,
• repérer les leaders communautaires hutu,
• surveiller les distributions alimentaires,
• signaler les endroits stratégiques susceptibles de résister à une attaque,
• transmettre des informations aux commandants de l'APR.

Ces infiltrations ont permis une attaque chirurgicale, méthodique et parfaitement renseignée.

Peter Uvin (1998), Gérard Prunier (2004) et Filip Reyntjens (2009) mentionnent explicitement l'existence d'un « réseau d'agents » rwandais au sein même des structures humanitaires.

2.3. Le retrait anticipé du personnel humanitaire

Dans les jours précédant l'attaque, plusieurs ONG évacuent discrètement leurs équipes étrangères vers Goma ou Kigali.
Des témoignages de MSF indiquent que :

• certaines ONG avaient reçu des « avis » provenant de Kigali ou d'offices diplomatiques ;
• des convois de véhicules humanitaires quittent les camps avant les bombardements ;
• le HCR déplace son personnel le plus sensible ;
• certains chefs de mission anticipent un « scénario de guerre totale ».

En clair, les humanitaires avaient le temps de fuir.
Les réfugiés, eux, n'ont pas été prévenus.

3. Le jour de l'attaque : les réfugiés abandonnés, les humanitaires absents

Lorsque l'AFDL et l'APR déclenchent l'offensive en octobre 1996 :

• le HCR n'est plus dans les camps,
• plusieurs ONG sont déjà repliées,
• aucun couloir humanitaire n'est mis en place,
• aucune stratégie de repli n'existe,
• aucune évacuation n'a été tentée.

Les réfugiés découvrent l'attaque sans avertissement. Les bombardements commencent immédiatement :

• Mugunga,
• Katale,
• Kahindo,
• Lac Vert,
• Bukavu Sud,
• Inera.

Les zones civiles sont visées en priorité. Des milliers de personnes sont tuées en moins de 48 heures.

Selon HRW – Shattered Lives (1997) :

« Les attaques visaient délibérément des zones densément peuplées de civils. »

Le HCR est introuvable.
Les ONG sont absentes.
Il n'y a ni eau, ni vivres, ni soins.
Les blessés sont abandonnés.

L'abandon est total.

4. La longue marche mortelle : traque, massacres et disparition de 200 000 réfugiés

Après la destruction des camps, les réfugiés tentent de s'enfoncer dans la forêt pour échapper aux tirs.
Les colonnes de civils s'étirent sur des centaines de kilomètres :

• Nord-Kivu → Maniema → Kisangani → Équateur.

C'est dans cette phase que se déroule la majorité des massacres.

4.1. Une traque systématique

Le UN Mapping Report (2010) décrit une logique militaire de poursuite :

• encerclement des colonnes ;
• exécutions sommaires ;
• disparitions forcées ;
• destruction volontaire des sources d'eau ;
• incendie des villages susceptibles d'héberger des réfugiés ;
• assassinats ciblés de leaders hutu.

Des fosses communes sont découvertes tout au long du parcours.
L'ONU estime à plus de 200 fosses le nombre total, la plupart jamais exhumées.

4.2. Le rôle du HCR et des ONG pendant la traque : le silence

Pendant ces mois de traque :

• le HCR ne déploie aucune équipe de protection,
• aucune aide alimentaire ne parvient aux réfugiés,
• aucune dénonciation publique n'est faite sur l'extermination en cours,
• aucune pression réelle n'est exercée sur Kigali.

Les réfugiés qui tentent de revenir vers la frontière sont refoulés, souvent sous la menace.

MSF, presque seule, tente d'alerter l'opinion.
Mais ses communiqués sont ignorés par les grandes puissances.

5. Le rôle des puissances occidentales : protection du Rwanda et sabotage de l'ONU

La responsabilité des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni est immense.

5.1. Les États-Unis : soutien diplomatique et blocage des interventions

Washington protège Kigali depuis 1994.
Dans le cas des réfugiés :

• les États-Unis bloquent l'intervention internationale proposée par le Canada,
• ils empêchent toute critique du Rwanda au Conseil de sécurité,
• ils minimisent les crimes,
• ils valorisent Kagame comme « stabilisateur régional ».

Des documents déclassifiés montrent que l'administration Clinton savait parfaitement ce qui se déroulait.

5.2. Le Royaume-Uni : la diplomatie du silence

Londres adopte une posture similaire, se rangeant systématiquement aux positions américaines.
Tony Blair deviendra plus tard un conseiller de Kagame.

5.3. La France et la Belgique, paralysées

La France, accusée d'avoir soutenu l'ancien régime hutu, craint d'être marginalisée.
La Belgique est traumatisée par le meurtre de ses casques bleus en 1994.

5.4. Résultat : l'ONU ne peut rien faire

Le blocage est total.
Aucune force de protection ne sera envoyée.

6. Le rôle du HCR : défaillance, complicité passive et abandon moral

Le HCR n'a pas tué les réfugiés.
Mais le HCR :

• savait,
• disposait des informations stratégiques,
• a employé des agents infiltrés,
• a évacué ses équipes,
• n'a organisé aucune fuite,
• a abandonné les réfugiés,
• a gardé le silence pendant la traque,
• a refusé de qualifier les faits.

Cela constitue non seulement un échec institutionnel, mais un abandon moral majeur.

Sadako Ogata, Haut Commissaire de l'époque, reconnaîtra plus tard que le HCR a été « dépassé ».
Mais ce mot est trop faible.

Le HCR ne fut pas dépassé :
il s'est retiré, il a cédé, il a capitulé.

7. La qualification juridique : crimes contre l'humanité, crimes de guerre… et peut-être génocide

Le UN Mapping Report indique que :

« Certains massacres, pris individuellement, pourraient être qualifiés de crimes de génocide si l'intention spécifique était établie. »

Les critères sont réunis :

• groupe visé identifiable (Hutu),
• attaques systématiques,
• intention possible de destruction,
• traque de milliers de kilomètres,
• exécutions massives de civils.

Ce débat reste empêché politiquement.
Car reconnaître ce génocide reviendrait à :

• accuser un allié clé de l'Occident,
• mettre en cause des États qui ont couvert les crimes,
• exposer la responsabilité morale du HCR et des ONG.

8. Conclusion : un abandon historique et une responsabilité collective

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre ne sont pas une simple « bavure humanitaire ».
Ils sont le résultat d'une combinaison de facteurs :

• la stratégie militaire du Rwanda ;
• la complicité politique des grandes puissances ;
• l'infiltration du système humanitaire ;
• le silence volontaire des ONG ;
• l'abandon logistique du HCR ;
• la passivité du Conseil de sécurité.

Le HCR savait.
Le HCR a employé des informateurs du FPR.
Le HCR a évacué son personnel avant l'attaque.
Le HCR n'a pas aidé les réfugiés à fuir.
Les ONG ont suivi la même logique.

Les réfugiés n'ont pas été seulement victimes de l'AFDL et de l'APR.
Ils ont été abandonnés par le monde entier.

Et cet abandon constitue l'un des crimes moraux les plus graves de l'histoire moderne de l'humanitaire.

Références

1. Nations Unies / ONU

Nations Unies – Haut-Commissariat aux Droits de l'Homme (HCDH).
Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire commises en République démocratique du Congo entre mars 1993 et juin 2003. Genève : ONU, août 2010.
(Version française officielle)

Nations Unies / Secrétaire général.
Rapport sur la situation des réfugiés et personnes déplacées dans l'est du Zaïre. Document ONU S/1996/1010, décembre 1996.

Nations Unies / Conseil de sécurité.
Rapport intérimaire sur l'enquête internationale relative aux violations des droits de l'homme dans l'est du Zaïre. Document ONU S/1997/826.

UNHCR (HCR – Haut-Commissariat pour les Réfugiés).
Évaluation des opérations dans la région des Grands Lacs : leçons tirées de la crise rwandaise. Rapport interne du HCR, Genève, 1997. (Disponible en français)

Assemblée générale de l'ONU.
Protection des civils dans les conflits armés. Document A/52/358, 1997.

2. Organisations des droits humains

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Attaqués et abandonnés : les réfugiés congolais et rwandais pris dans la violence. New York : HRW/Afrique, 1997. (Version française)

Human Rights Watch.
Alison Des Forges, Aucun témoin ne doit survivre : Le génocide au Rwanda. Paris : Karthala / Human Rights Watch, 1999.

FIDH – Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme.
Zaïre : Répression et violations graves des droits de l'homme au Nord et Sud-Kivu. Rapport FIDH / HRW, 1996.

Amnesty International.
Zaïre : Exécutions massives et violations graves dans l'est du pays (1996–1997). Londres : Amnesty International, 1997.

International Rescue Committee (IRC).
Enquêtes de mortalité en RDC : rapports de synthèse. New York : IRC, 2000. (Résumé disponible en français)

3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières.
Fuite forcée : la crise des réfugiés au Zaïre. MSF, Bruxelles/Paris, 1997.

Médecins Sans Frontières.
Zaïre : 1996–1997 – Catalogue des massacres. Témoignages MSF, 1997.

Rony Brauman (ancien président de MSF).
Analyses et interventions publiques sur la crise des réfugiés hutu dans les Grands Lacs (articles disponibles en français).

4. Ouvrages académiques et universitaires en français

Gérard Prunier.
La guerre mondiale africaine : L'effondrement du Congo, 1996–2006. Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 2009. (Traduction française de Africa's World War)

Gérard Prunier.
Rwanda : Le génocide. Paris : Éditions Dagorno, 1997.

Filip Reyntjens.
Le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda et ses conséquences régionales. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2010.

Filip Reyntjens.
Rwanda : Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2014.

René Lemarchand.
La politique de la mémoire et les violences au Rwanda et au Burundi. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2009.

Peter Uvin.
Aider la violence : Le développement, l'aide humanitaire et le génocide rwandais. Bruxelles : Éditions Complexe, 2003. (Traduction française de Aiding Violence)

Mahmood Mamdani.
Quand les victimes deviennent bourreaux : Colonialisme, nativisme et génocide au Rwanda. Paris : La Découverte, 2010.

Colette Braeckman.
L'enjeu congolais : L'Afrique centrale après Mobutu. Paris : Fayard, 1999.

Colette Braeckman.
Rwanda : Histoire d'un génocide. Bruxelles : Éditions Luc Pire, 1994.

5. Enquêtes journalistiques et documents secondaires (en français)

Colette Braeckman (Le Soir, Belgique).
Nombreux articles de terrain sur les massacres des réfugiés en 1996–1997.

Stephen Smith (Libération, Le Monde).
Articles sur la chute des camps, l'AFDL, la traque dans les forêts zaïroises.

Jean-Philippe Rémy (Le Monde).
Dossiers sur la disparition des réfugiés hutu et les fosses communes.

International Crisis Group (ICG).
Rapports disponibles en version française :
"L'Afrique des Grands Lacs : Le naufrage du Zaïre" ;
"Rwanda et Congo-Zaïre : Déstabilisation régionale."

6. Sources complémentaires francophones

Global Witness (version française).
Rapports sur la présence militaire rwandaise en RDC dans les années 1990 et 2000.

La Voix des Sans-Voix (VSV), ONG congolaise.
Rapports sur les violations commises contre les réfugiés hutu en RDC (1996–1998).

Syndicat National des Travailleurs Humanitaires (France).
Analyses sur les défaillances du système humanitaire dans la région des Grands Lacs.

Préparé par :
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue
African Rights Alliance, London, UK

 

The Washington Accords: A Disguised Strategy for Exploiting Congolese Minerals for the Benefit of Rwanda and the United States

For over two decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been at the heart of an economic and geopolitical war linked to its immense natural resources. The provinces of North and South Kivu, rich in coltan, gold, cobalt, cassiterite, and other strategic minerals, have become the theater of a conflict that extends far beyond national borders.

Behind the official rhetoric of peace and regional integration lie colossal economic interests. The recent Washington Accords between Rwanda and the DRC, as well as the regional economic integration project supervised by the United States, fit into this logic. In reality, they constitute a diplomatically crafted instrument designed to legitimize and institutionalize the exploitation of Congolese minerals by Rwanda, for the benefit of foreign powers, primarily the United States.

1. The Context: Cooperation Under Tension

The DRC, a sovereign country endowed with natural resources estimated at over $24 trillion, has long sought to attract strategic partners to develop its economy and stabilize its institutions. In this context, the Congolese government requested support from Washington to strengthen security in the East and establish economic cooperation focused on local valorization of critical minerals—cobalt, lithium, copper, and tantalum—essential to the global energy transition.

However, instead of a direct bilateral partnership between Kinshasa and Washington, the United States introduced a third actor: Rwanda. This choice, perceived as a provocation by many Congolese, is explained by the historical and military proximity between Washington and Kigali, considered a stable and docile ally in the Great Lakes region.

Thus, the Washington Accords resulted in the creation of a tripartite framework purportedly focused on economic integration and regional stability. But behind this facade of cooperation, a system of legalized exploitation of Congolese resources is being established.

2. Rwanda as the United States' Strategic Intermediary

Rwanda, a country of 26,000 km² devoid of significant mineral resources, has paradoxically become one of the world's largest exporters of coltan and cassiterite—two minerals not found in exploitable quantities on its soil. This glaring contradiction is explained by the systematic smuggling of Congolese minerals from areas under the control of armed groups supported by Kigali, notably the M23.

By introducing Rwanda into the Washington Accords, the United States indirectly officializes this illegitimate intermediary role. Rwanda becomes a diplomatic and economic corridor through which Congolese minerals transit before being exported to American and Western industries.

This strategy allows Washington to present itself as a neutral peacemaking partner, while guaranteeing a stable supply of critical minerals indispensable to its technology giants (Apple, Tesla, Boeing, etc.) without having to negotiate directly with a Congolese state perceived as unstable and difficult to control.

3. Regional Economic Integration: A Facade for Spoliation

3.1. The Mechanism of Asymmetric Integration

Under the pretext of regional economic integration, the accords promote the free movement of goods, capital, and services between the DRC, Rwanda, and other countries in the region. On the surface, this could favor cross-border trade and economic cooperation. But in practice, this openness primarily benefits Rwanda, which already has well-organized export logistics, modern industrial free zones, and an effective diplomatic network.

Minerals extracted from Kivu are illegally transported to Gisenyi or Goma, then shipped to Kigali, where they are reclassified as Rwandan products before being exported to international markets. Regional economic integration, supported by Washington, legalizes this chain of exploitation by removing criticism of Rwanda's theft of DRC resources.

Rwanda, under the guise of a "reliable regional partner," thus consolidates its role as an economic intermediary, while further weakening the DRC's sovereignty over its own resources.

3.2. The Value Transfer Strategy: From Raw Congo to Refined Rwanda

One of the most revealing aspects of the Washington Accords lies in how they organize the mining value chain between the DRC and Rwanda. According to the practical provisions of this regional cooperation, raw minerals extracted from Congolese soil—cobalt, coltan, copper, tin, and gold—are transported to Rwanda, where new processing and refining plants financed by American, Asian, and European funds are installed.

In other words, the industrial added value, that is, the most profitable phase of the mining process, is not created in the DRC, the producing country, but displaced to Rwanda, a non-producing country. This economic scheme transforms the DRC into a mere raw material supplier, while Rwanda becomes the center of transformation, export, and profit. This is contrary to the African strategy of valorizing their natural resources locally instead of exporting them in raw form to industrialized countries.

Washington justifies this choice by citing the need for political stability, investment security, and "good governance," implying that the DRC is not yet ready to host cutting-edge industrial infrastructure. In reality, this is a perfectly calculated strategy aimed at controlling the value chain without directly depending on a sovereign Congolese state.

Thus, the United States indirectly finances Rwandan industrial zones specialized in coltan and lithium processing, under the cover of "regional cooperation." Rwanda then exports these processed minerals under its own national label, receiving the commercial and diplomatic benefits of a product that originally comes from Congolese soil.

This mechanism reinforces the asymmetry: Congo becomes impoverished by exporting raw materials, while Rwanda and its Western partners enrich themselves by exporting refined products. This is not regional integration—it is an organized externalization of Congolese economic value.

3.3. A Selective Regional Framework Serving Rwanda

Another troubling aspect of the Washington Accords is their partially opaque and selective character. Officially, it is supposed to be a regional economic cooperation framework open to several countries in East Africa and the Great Lakes, including the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda. However, in practice, only Rwanda benefits from immediate and privileged integration in the first phase of the project.

Neither Burundi, despite being a DRC neighbor and holder of strategic mineral resources similar to those of Kivu (nickel, rare earths, gold), nor Tanzania, a key logistical actor with its ports and commercial corridors, have been actively associated with the initial cooperation framework. Burundi, which deploys its troops alongside Congolese forces to fight armed groups, has been excluded from the process without clear justification.

This selective exclusion highlights the American strategy: to entrust Rwanda with the role of regional pivot, both political and economic, in managing and exporting Congolese minerals. Rwanda thus becomes the "model partner" chosen by Washington to supervise the supply chain of critical minerals, while other countries in the region are relegated to a secondary or consultative role.

The paradox is all the more glaring since the United Nations Security Council has repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory, accused of supporting armed groups responsible for serious human rights violations. Yet, despite this requirement, Rwanda remains at the heart of economic cooperation supported by the United States, which amounts to diplomatic legitimization of a de facto occupation.

In sum, these accords reveal that Washington is not acting as a neutral arbiter, but as an organizing power of a hierarchical regional exploitation system, where Rwanda is promoted to the rank of principal manager of Congolese wealth, while the DRC and its regional allies are marginalized.

3.4. The Diplomatic Paradox: Washington Speaks of Peace While Rewarding the Aggressor

One of the most glaring paradoxes of the Washington Accords lies in the contradiction between the discourse of peace and the reality of alliances. Officially, the United States presents itself as a mediator in the conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, advocating regional stability, economic cooperation, and an end to hostilities. However, in practice, American policy rewards precisely the state accused of fueling the war: Rwanda.

By granting Kigali a central role in the processing and commercialization of Congolese minerals, Washington sends a dangerous message—that a country can benefit from military aggression, provided it serves the strategic economic interests of the West. This approach not only undermines the credibility of the United States as an impartial actor, but it directly undermines peace efforts undertaken by the East African Community (EAC) and SADC (Southern African Development Community).

This diplomatic favoritism reflects a logic of "conditional peace," where Congo's security depends not on respect for its sovereignty, but on its ability to accept an imposed economic framework. In other words, the goal is not to resolve the causes of the conflict—namely the occupation and pillage of resources—but to institutionalize this pillage in a presentable form.

While Rwanda benefits from American investments in its processing plants and special economic zones, the DRC continues to bear the human and environmental consequences of an endless war: massive population displacements, civilian massacres, infrastructure destruction, loss of control over its mining borders.

The UN Security Council has confirmed Rwanda's responsibility in supporting the M23 and in violations of Congolese sovereignty. But Washington, instead of sanctioning its ally, chooses to reward it with economic partnerships. This inconsistency lays bare the true nature of these accords: it is not about peace, but about a geoeconomic reconfiguration of mining exploitation disguised as diplomacy.

Thus, behind the seductive vocabulary of "regional cooperation" and "economic integration," lies a brutal reality: the Washington Accords legitimize Rwanda's stranglehold on Congolese minerals, while offering the United States privileged access to these resources under an appearance of legality.

4. The United States and Securing Their Strategic Supply

The global energy transition relies on so-called critical minerals: cobalt, lithium, copper, and nickel. The DRC holds more than 70% of the world's cobalt reserves, a metal indispensable to the manufacture of electric batteries and green technologies. The United States, concerned about reducing its dependence on China, has intensified its efforts to secure alternative supply sources.

But working directly with the DRC entails political and logistical risks: instability, corruption, insecurity. Rwanda, on the other hand, offers a centralized, disciplined governance model aligned with Western interests. Thus, under the umbrella of the Washington Accords, the United States delegates the regional management of its mining interests to Kigali. Instead of helping the DRC improve its economic governance, security in the east, and the exploitation/enhancement of Congolese resources locally, the United States opts for the cheaper and existing route, which is Rwanda. This demonstrates that in reality, the DRC benefits nothing from these accords and its bilateral initiatives with the United States.

This triangular system presents three strategic advantages for Washington:

1. It masks the reality of spoliation behind a discourse of regional integration.
2. It reduces the political and financial costs associated with direct negotiation with Kinshasa.
3. It ensures a stable supply of strategic minerals for its industries.

Clearly, the United States does not need to consolidate economic relations with the DRC: it is sufficient for them to control economic flows through a satellite state—Rwanda.

5. The Washington Accords: Officializing the Theft of Congolese Minerals

In reality, the Washington Accords are nothing more than a diplomatic packaging of the already existing pillage of the Democratic Republic of Congo's resources. For over 25 years, Rwanda has illegally exploited Congolese minerals through armed groups it directly supports in the eastern part of the country. Now, with the blessing of the United States, this spoliation is provided with an "official" framework that makes it presentable on the international stage.

Under the pretext of regional economic cooperation, minerals extracted from the Congolese provinces of North and South Kivu continue to be transported to Rwanda, where they are "laundered" through legally recognized export circuits. These minerals, often stamped as "Rwandan," are then sold on American, Asian, and European markets, integrated into the supply chains of major technology companies. Thus, war and occupation become economically profitable for Kigali, while the DRC becomes mired in chronic insecurity and loss of economic sovereignty.

The United States, by promoting these accords at the very moment when Rwanda militarily occupies part of eastern Congo, effectively validates this occupation. Instead of demanding the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, as ordered by the UN Security Council, Washington chooses to reward the aggressor by entrusting it with the industrial and commercial management of Congolese minerals.

The Washington Accords are therefore not an instrument of peace, but a tool for legitimizing theft and regional domination. They officialize the continuous transfer of Congolese wealth to Rwanda, while maintaining war as a control mechanism. While Congo exhausts itself in conflicts, Rwanda enriches itself, and the United States secures its mining interests under the cover of economic diplomacy.

6. Consequences for Congolese Sovereignty

For the DRC, the implications of these accords are serious. First, they undermine national sovereignty by de facto transferring part of the country's economic control to a historically hostile neighbor. Second, they perpetuate the colonial logic of resource extraction without local transformation or real benefits for the Congolese population.

Despite promises of investment and cooperation, no major infrastructure has been built to refine or process minerals in the DRC. Wealth leaves Congolese soil in raw form, enriching foreign financial circuits and depriving the Congolese state of essential tax revenues.

Finally, from a security perspective, these accords legitimize Rwanda's presence in the Kivu region, under the guise of regional cooperation. This further weakens pacification efforts, as armed groups supported by Kigali continue to operate with impunity in mining areas.

7. The Complicit Silence of International Institutions

The international community, though informed of this situation, adopts an ambivalent attitude. The United Nations and major Western powers congratulate themselves on "regional integration efforts" and "cross-border economic cooperation," without questioning the legitimacy of Rwanda's role in exploiting Congolese resources.

Reports by UN experts, Human Rights Watch, or Amnesty International have documented for years the systematic pillage of Congo by Rwanda and other foreign actors. However, these reports remain without real political consequences, as they directly contradict the economic interests of the United States and its allies.

8. Diplomacy of Pillage Under the Cover of Peace

Ultimately, the Washington Accords and regional economic integration are diplomatic instruments that institutionalize pillage. Under the pretext of strengthening peace and cooperation, they construct an economic architecture where the DRC remains the raw supplier, Rwanda the processor, and the United States the final consumer.

This hierarchy perpetuates colonial inequalities: Congo remains a modern "mining colony," while Rwanda plays the role of a docile intermediary valued by the West. Peace is not the real objective; it is merely a narrative tool to guarantee the continuity of exploitation.

Conclusion: Cooperation That Conceals Economic Domination

The Washington Accords do not represent progress toward peace or equitable regional integration, but rather a sophisticated reconfiguration of the pillage of Congolese resources. By placing Rwanda at the center of the economic and industrial apparatus, the United States has chosen to entrust an actor accused of aggression and occupation with the role of manager of Congolese minerals. This choice is not insignificant: it reveals a geopolitical strategy where economic control takes precedence over justice and sovereignty.

Under the cover of "regional cooperation," Washington seeks to secure its supply of critical minerals—cobalt, lithium, coltan—essential to its technology industry and the global energy transition. But instead of helping the DRC develop its own processing capabilities and strengthen its national economy, these accords externalize the added value to Rwanda, thereby consolidating a neocolonial exploitation model.

Congo, once again, finds itself at the bottom of the global value chain, exporting raw wealth and importing poverty. While Kigali reaps diplomatic and economic benefits, Kinshasa loses control of its resources and its industrial destiny.

True peace in the region will not come from pacts imposed from Washington, but from a restoration of economic sovereignty to the DRC and strict respect for international law. As long as Congolese minerals are exploited by proxy, no sustainable regional integration or genuine stability will be possible.

The Washington Accords are not an initiative for equitable cooperation. They represent a new chapter of economic neocolonialism in Central Africa, where American diplomacy allies itself with a complicit regime to secure its strategic interests.

As long as the DRC does not demand direct and transparent bilateral cooperation based on mutual respect, and as long as it tolerates Rwandan interference in its economic affairs, its sovereignty will remain theoretical.

What is at stake through these accords is not merely a question of trade, but a question of national dignity and control of strategic resources that should serve the development of the Congolese people, not enrich foreign powers through a predatory neighbor.

The DRC must break the cycle of pillage and dependency, refuse asymmetric accords dictated by Washington, and take back control of the destiny of its minerals, which constitute not only the key to its future, but also to its true economic and political independence.

---

References

[1] International Crisis Group, "Eastern Congo: The ADF and the Prison of War", Africa Report N°298, 2021.

[2] World Bank, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Systematic Country Diagnostic", 2018. Estimates vary by source, ranging from $24 trillion to $35 trillion USD.

[3] U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa: Advancing African Peace and Prosperity", 2022.

[4] Reyntjens, Filip, "Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship", African Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 411, 2004, pp. 177-210.

[5] United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Report S/2023/431, June 2023. Rwanda annually exports thousands of tons of coltan and cassiterite despite the absence of significant exploitable reserves.

[6] Human Rights Watch, "Democratic Republic of Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes", December 2022. The report documents Rwanda's military and logistical support to the M23.

[7] Nest, Michael, "Coltan", Polity Press, 2011. Detailed analysis of the global supply chain of Congolese coltan to the electronics industry.

[8] Montague, Dena, "Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo", SAIS Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2002, pp. 103-118.

[9] African Development Bank, "Mineral Value Chains in Africa: Rwanda's Positioning in Regional Mineral Processing", 2023.

[10] African Union, Agenda 2063: "The Africa We Want", 2015. The AU promotes industrialization and local transformation of raw materials as a strategic priority.

[11] Enough Project, "From Mine to Mobile Phone: The Conflict Minerals Supply Chain", 2009. Documentary on the laundering of Congolese minerals via Rwanda.

[12] BBC News, "Burundi sends troops to help DR Congo fight rebels", August 2022.

[13] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2666 (2022), S/RES/2666, December 2022. Demand for immediate withdrawal of M23 and condemnation of external support to armed groups.

[14] Southern African Development Community (SADC), "Communiqué on the Political and Security Situation in the DRC", Luanda, November 2022.

[15] UNHCR, "DR Congo Emergency", 2023. More than 6 million internally displaced persons due to conflicts in the East.

[16] United Nations Group of Experts, Report S/2022/967, December 2022. Confirmation of Rwandan support to M23 with photographic and testimonial evidence.

[17] U.S. Geological Survey, "Mineral Commodity Summaries: Cobalt", 2024. The DRC produces approximately 70-75% of the world's cobalt.

[18] The White House, "Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth", June 2021.

[19] Barma, Naazneen H. et al., "Rents to Riches? The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development", World Bank Publications, 2012.

[20] UN Panel of Experts Report on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Wealth of the DRC, S/2001/357, April 2001. First major report documenting systematic pillage.

[21] Global Witness, "Faced with a Gun, What Can You Do? War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo", 2009.

[22] Rodney, Walter, "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa", Howard University Press, 1972. Classic analysis of colonial extraction mechanisms still relevant today.

[23] Kivu Security Tracker (KST), database on violence in eastern DRC, accessed 2024.

[24] Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: 'This is What We Die For': Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt", 2016; Human Rights Watch, annual reports 2018-2023.

[25] Hochschild, Adam, "King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa", Houghton Mifflin, 1998. Historical context of Congolese pillage.

---

Supplementary Bibliography

• Autesserre, Séverine, "The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding", Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• Cuvelier, Jeroen, "The Complexity of Resource Governance in a Context of State Fragility: The Case of Eastern DRC", International Peace Information Service (IPIS), 2014.
• Geenen, Sara & Verweijen, Judith, "Explaining fragmented and fluid mobilization in gold mining concessions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo", The Extractive Industries and Society, Vol. 4, Issue 4, 2017.
• Kabamba, Patience, "Business of Civil War: New Forms of Life in the Debris of the Democratic Republic of Congo", Dakar: CODESRIA, 2013.
• Stearns, Jason K., "Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa", PublicAffairs, 2011.
• Turner, Thomas, "The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality", Zed Books, 2007.
• Van Reybrouck, David, "Congo: The Epic History of a People", HarperCollins, 2014.