Why Peace and Stability Have Been So Difficult to Achieve in the Great Lakes Region Over the Last 30 Years

Why Peace and Stability Have Been So Difficult to Achieve in the Great Lakes Region Over the Last 30 Years

For more than three decades, the Great Lakes Region of Africa—especially Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—has struggled to achieve genuine peace, stability, and regional cooperation. Conflicts have erupted repeatedly, borders have been militarised, and millions of civilians have been displaced or killed. Although historical factors and colonial legacies contribute to much of this instability, the prolonged failures of peace efforts cannot be understood without addressing the behaviour of contemporary leaders, state structures, and regional geopolitics. Authoritarianism, overstaying in power, ethnic favouritism, clientelism, nepotism, and the selfish pursuit of personal and family interests have played a central role in perpetuating instability. At the same time, illegal exploitation of natural resources, the rise of proxy armed groups, and international powers supporting leaders who protect their interests—rather than the interests of citizens—have deepened the crisis.

This essay analyses why peace has been so difficult to achieve, focusing on governance failures, regional power politics, and long-standing structural drivers of conflict.

1. Overstaying in Power and the Crisis of Leadership

One of the most fundamental obstacles to peace in the Great Lakes Region is the persistence of rulers who refuse to leave power. Political leadership in the region has become personalised, entrenched, and sustained through manipulation of constitutions, militarisation, and repression. Two of the most illustrative examples are Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda.

Museveni: Nearly 40 Years in Power

Museveni came to power in 1986 after a guerrilla war, presenting himself as a liberator committed to democracy, security, and social transformation. But over time, he has followed the same authoritarian path he once condemned:

• Repeatedly amending the constitution to remove term limits (2005) and age limits (2017)
• Concentrating power in the presidency and security agencies
• Weakening parliament and the judiciary
• Violently repressing opposition movements such as FDC and the People Power/NUP movement
• Creating a political system increasingly dominated by military elites and personal loyalists

Museveni's long rule has also become increasingly personal and dynastic—designed to ensure that power eventually transfers to his son, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba. Instead of acting as a regional elder statesman who promotes peace, Museveni has become deeply self-interested and consumed by internal political survival. His military interventions in the region—supporting rebel groups in Congo in the late 1990s, clashing with Rwanda in Kisangani, and taking sides in South Sudan—have been driven less by peacebuilding and more by regional influence and economic gain.

Uganda remains under his personal control, and his regime no longer has the moral authority or credibility to act as an impartial peace facilitator. His legacy, rather than regional stability, is increasingly defined by self-preservation, militarisation, and family succession.

Kagame: Another Leader Preparing a Dynastic Future

Rwanda presents a similar trajectory. Kagame has been in power de facto since 1994 and officially since 2000. Despite some economic progress  that benefit largely  a small group of the regime, Kagame has built a highly centralised, tightly controlled authoritarian state. Like Museveni, he has removed term limits and positioned himself to remain in power indefinitely. The political system is characterised by:

• Limited political pluralism
• Systemic repression of dissent
• Surveillance and exile politics
• Elite dominance by individuals linked to the ruling RPF

Kagame is also preparing a dynastic model, with increasing political visibility for his children, especially Ange Kagame. This trend mirrors Museveni's model of personalisation of the state.

Such leadership patterns create deep frustration among citizens who see no legitimate avenues for political participation, power transition, or accountability. This political closure builds long-term instability.

2. Ethnic Favouritism, Clientelism, and Nepotism

Across the region, political power is often based not on citizenship or merit, but on ethnic affiliation and loyalty to ruling elites. This is particularly evident in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and parts of eastern Congo. Political systems built on ethnic favouritism create:

• Exclusion of large populations
• Entrenched inequality
• Distrust between communities
• Grievances that fuel armed mobilisation

In Rwanda, power remains heavily concentrated in the hands of a small group of elites predominantly from one region and one historical political network. In Uganda, the military and political hierarchy is dominated by individuals from Museveni's western region and close family allies. In Burundi, political competition along Hutu–Tutsi lines has remained a core source of tension.

Clientelism—where leaders exchange resources, protection, or jobs for political loyalty—reinforces these systems. Nepotism ensures that family members occupy key positions in the security apparatus, economy, or diplomatic posts.

Such governance systems weaken national unity, erode trust in state institutions, and create fertile ground for rebellion when excluded groups seek access to power by force.

3. Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and War Economies

The Great Lakes Region, particularly eastern DRC, contains some of the world's richest deposits of gold, coltan, cobalt, tin, diamonds, and timber. These resources have been at the heart of regional conflict since the 1990s. Instead of benefiting local populations, natural resources have become:

• A source of illicit wealth
• A motivation for foreign military interventions
• A means of financing armed groups
• A driver of corruption among state officials

Uganda, Rwanda, and other regional actors have been repeatedly accused by UN experts, human rights organisations, and international watchdogs of benefiting from the illegal exploitation of Congolese minerals. During the First and Second Congo Wars, Rwandan and Ugandan military officers, along with local rebel groups, engaged in systematic extraction of natural resources.

This war economy has not disappeared. Instead, it has become more sophisticated:

• Exporting gold mined in Congo through Kigali or Kampala
• Financing local militias to control mining zones
• Taxing artisanal miners
• Using companies linked to political elites to transport and sell minerals

As long as conflict brings profit, regional elites have little incentive to support genuine peace. Illegal exploitation fuels the creation of armed groups, undermines peace agreements, and keeps eastern Congo in a perpetual state of insecurity.

4. Proxy Warfare and the Formation of Armed Groups

Another major obstacle to peace is the long-standing practice of governments supporting proxy armed groups in neighbouring countries in order to advance strategic interests. Examples include:

• Rwanda supporting the AFDL in 1996–1997, the RCD in 1998–2003, and the M23 in recent years
• Uganda supporting various rebel groups in Congo during both Congo wars
• Burundi and Rwanda accusing each other of supporting opposition armed groups
• Congolese elites financing tribal militias to maintain political and economic influence

The use of proxies destabilises entire regions, causes mass displacement, and destroys trust between governments. Even when peace agreements are signed, proxy forces remain a tool for bargaining power, making the peace fragile and temporary.

When countries fight indirectly through militias, the region becomes locked in a perpetual cycle of accusation, retaliation, and suspicion. Regional institutions such as the African Union, ICGLR, and EAC have limited authority to enforce political accountability, allowing governments to deny involvement while continuing to arm rebels.

5. International Powers Prioritising Their Own Interests

International actors—Western countries, the UN, and global powers—have played a contradictory role in the region. Instead of supporting democratic governance and human rights, many have backed authoritarian leaders who align with their geopolitical and security interests.

Paul Kagame is one of the most striking examples of this dynamic. Despite credible reports of political repression, involvement in Congo's conflicts, and human rights violations, Rwanda has received strong political and financial support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western allies. These powers see Rwanda as:

• A security partner
• A stabilising force
• A regional ally
• An example of economic reform

As long as Kagame serves the strategic needs of powerful nations—peacekeeping forces, counterterrorism alignment, control of migration—his domestic authoritarianism and regional interventions are tolerated.

Similarly, Museveni has remained in power largely because he serves the security and diplomatic interests of the United States and Europe. Uganda is a major contributor to peacekeeping operations in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS), a close security partner of Western intelligence, and a regional military actor. Western governments value his stability more than Uganda's democracy.

This external support encourages leaders to ignore human rights, suppress dissent, and overstay in power because they know they will not face meaningful international consequences.

6. The Accumulation of Frustration and Long-Term Instability

All these factors—selfish leadership, authoritarianism, ethnic exclusion, resource exploitation, and proxy warfare—create a profound sense of frustration among the population. When citizens feel:

• Excluded from political life
• Deprived of economic opportunity
• Exploited by leaders who serve foreign interests
• Repressed for expressing dissent
• Witnessing their countries used as battlegrounds for regional rivalries

they lose faith in peaceful political processes. This environment is fertile ground for:

• Youth radicalisation
• Ethnic mobilisation
• The formation of new rebel movements
• Protests and violent state repression
• Cycles of revenge between communities

The region becomes locked in a cycle where instability sustains authoritarianism, and authoritarianism produces new forms of instability.

Lack of Democracy, Human Rights, and Freedom of Assembly

Another major factor undermining peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region is the systematic absence of democracy, respect for human rights, and freedom of assembly. Governments in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and to some extent the DRC have consistently suppressed political opposition, independent media, and civil society. In Rwanda, for example, prominent opposition leader Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza spent eight years in prison after returning from exile in 2010 to challenge the government through peaceful political means. Many other activists, journalists, and opposition figures—such as Déogratias Mushayidi, Bernard Ntaganda, Kizito Mihigo, and members of the FDU-Inkingi—have been jailed, forcibly disappeared, or subjected to intimidation.

Others have been killed either inside Rwanda or in foreign countries, including assassinations in South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, and Uganda, often targeting former intelligence officials, political critics, or defectors. The same pattern exists in Uganda, where state repression has intensified against opposition groups such as NUP, with peaceful protesters routinely beaten, arrested, or killed by security forces.

Across the region, peaceful demonstrations are banned or violently dispersed, violating constitutional rights and creating an atmosphere where citizens cannot express grievances or participate in political decision-making. Without freedom of speech, political competition, or peaceful assembly, frustrations build up, pushing some groups to seek change through violent or extra-legal means. The lack of democratic space therefore becomes a direct driver of political instability, social tension, and cycles of conflict that threaten long-term peace in the Great Lakes Region.

Solutions to the Persistent Instability in the Great Lakes Region

Solving the complex crises of the Great Lakes Region requires a combination of political reform, regional cooperation, economic transformation, institutional strengthening, and international accountability. No single measure can bring peace, because the causes of instability are interconnected—authoritarianism feeds regional conflict, illegal resource exploitation fuels armed groups, and the lack of justice creates cycles of revenge.

Below are the major solutions needed to build lasting peace.

1. Democratic Reforms and Respect for Political Freedoms

a. Restore term limits and end the culture of life-long rulers

Ending overstaying in power is essential. Constitutions must be respected, not modified to benefit individuals. Peaceful transfer of power should become a norm in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the DRC.

b. Free political prisoners and protect freedom of expression

Opposition leaders such as Victoire Ingabire and other political activists, journalists, and civil society members must be released and allowed to participate freely in politics.

c. Allow peaceful demonstrations and free media

Democracy cannot exist without public debate. Governments must stop repressing peaceful protests and stop criminalising dissent. Independent media must be allowed to operate without intimidation.

d. Strengthen parliaments, courts, and local governance

A balance of power reduces dictatorship and ensures that local grievances are addressed before they escalate.

2. Address Ethnic Favouritism, Clientelism, and Nepotism

a. Build inclusive governments

States must represent all communities—not only one ethnic group, region, or political network.

b. Create transparent public-service recruitment systems

Jobs in the army, police, government ministries, and state companies must be based on merit, not ethnicity or loyalty to the ruling elite.

c. Reform security institutions

Security forces must serve the nation—not one ethnic group or political leader.

These measures reduce long-term grievances and help rebuild trust among communities.

3. Economic Reforms and Equitable Development

a. Create jobs, especially for the youth

Unemployment fuels rebel recruitment and criminal networks. Investment in agriculture, energy, technology, and manufacturing is essential.

b. Reduce corruption and improve financial transparency

Public resources must serve citizens, not enrich elites.

c. Promote equitable development across regions

When some regions prosper while others remain neglected, resentment grows and fuels conflict.

4. Ending Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources

a. Regulate and formalise mining

Governments in the region—especially DRC—must formalise artisanal mining, create transparent taxation, and eliminate warlord control of mining sites.

b. Impose sanctions on companies involved in illicit mineral trade

Sanctions must target:

• army officers,
• powerful businessmen,
• political elites,
• multinational companies.

c. Regional mineral certification

A strong mechanism is needed to track the origin of minerals and stop smuggling through neighbouring countries.

Ending the illegal mineral economy is one of the most important steps in achieving peace.

5. Ending Proxy Wars and Support for Armed Groups

a. Enforce strict regional agreements

The ICGLR, AU, and EAC must enforce consequences when states support proxy groups like M23, ADF splinter factions, RED-Tabara, FDLR remnants, Mai-Mai militias, etc.

b. Strengthen border control and intelligence cooperation

Joint border patrols and shared intelligence can help identify and dismantle armed networks.

c. Demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs

Former fighters must be reintegrated into society to limit the recycling of rebel groups.

d. Stop using refugees as political weapons

Governments must guarantee refugee protection and stop infiltrating refugee camps with armed elements.

6. Justice, Accountability, and Reconciliation

a. Establish regional tribunals or hybrid courts

Impunity is a major cause of recurring violence. Perpetrators of massacres, assassinations, illegal resource exploitation, and repression must be held accountable—regardless of political position.

b. Create truth and reconciliation processes

Communities need spaces to speak openly about:

• genocide crimes,
• massacres,
• revenge killings,
• ethnic persecution.

Without truth, reconciliation is impossible.

c. Protect witnesses and victims

Many fear reprisals. Protection mechanisms are essential for justice to function.

7. Strengthen Regional Institutions and Cooperation

a. Reform the African Union, EAC, and ICGLR

These institutions often lack teeth. They need:

• enforcement mechanisms,
• rapid intervention capacity,
• clear sanctions for states that fuel conflict.

b. Promote joint development projects

Roads, energy grids, rail lines, and trade systems can bind countries together economically, reducing incentives for conflict.

c. Empower regional civil-society organisations

Grassroots peacebuilders, human rights groups, youth movements, and women's networks must be part of decision-making—not only governments.

8. International Actors Must Change Their Approach

a. Stop supporting authoritarian regimes for strategic interests

Western powers must stop giving unconditional support to dictatorial leaders who repress their populations and destabilise neighbours.

b. Promote consistent human rights standards

The same standards must apply to all countries—whether Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, or others.

c. Support democratic transitions, not just military stability

Short-term stability based on authoritarianism creates long-term conflict.

d. Make peacekeeping missions more effective

UN missions must:

• improve civilian protection,
• disrupt armed group financing,
• work with regional mechanisms,
• pressure governments to stop supporting militias.

9. Empower Youth and Civil Society

a. Provide education, skills, and employment opportunities

A region where 60% of the population is under 25 cannot have peace if youth remain excluded.

b. Support local peace initiatives

Dialogue, community policing, and local conflict-resolution mechanisms can reduce violence at the grassroots level.

c. Protect journalists, activists, and human rights defenders

A vibrant civil society helps keep governments accountable and exposes corruption or abuses.

10. Promote Long-Term Cultural and Social Healing

a. Reduce hate speech, ethnic propaganda, and historical manipulation

Education systems should teach inclusive national histories—not ethnic superiority or distorted narratives.

b. Support trauma healing and psychosocial programmes

Millions of people in the region have lived through war, genocide, rape, displacement, and repression. Without healing, trauma becomes a driver of violence.

11. Strengthen the CEPGL (Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs)

A critical but often forgotten solution is the revival and strengthening of the CEPGL, the regional organisation linking Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. Created in 1976, the CEPGL was designed to promote economic integration, free movement of people, shared infrastructure, and mutual security cooperation. However, decades of political tension, war, and mistrust have made it largely inactive. Revitalising the CEPGL would provide a powerful platform for rebuilding regional cooperation and reducing conflict. Strengthening the organisation would require: restoring regular high-level political dialogue; reactivating joint institutions such as the Development Bank of the Great Lakes (BDGL), the Energy Organisation of the Great Lakes (EGL), and the International Institute for Agriculture and Livestock (IRAZ); establishing transparent mechanisms for cross-border trade and resource management; and implementing joint border-security arrangements to prevent the movement of armed groups. A strong CEPGL would help rebuild confidence between member states, promote regional development, reduce economic imbalances, and limit the militarisation of borders. If effectively supported, the CEPGL could become one of the most important pillars for long-term peace, stability, and shared prosperity in the Great Lakes Region.

12. Rwanda's Regional Ambitions and the Self-Proclaimed Role as "Protector of All Tutsi"

Another key driver of instability in the Great Lakes Region is Rwanda's long-standing ambition to project power beyond its borders, particularly into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 1996, the Rwandan government has repeatedly justified military interventions in Congo by claiming to protect its national security from groups like the FDLR, but also by asserting a broader regional responsibility to protect all Tutsi populations, whether in Congo, Burundi, Uganda, or elsewhere. This doctrine—never officially written but consistently invoked in speeches, policies, and intelligence operations—has allowed Rwanda to position itself as the self-appointed guardian of Tutsi communities, especially Congolese Tutsi/Banyamulenge and Rwandophone groups in North and South Kivu.

While community protection is legitimate, the political use of this narrative has generated profound suspicion and hostility among neighbouring states. Many governments view Rwanda's "protector" role as a cover for geopolitical influence, military operations, and economic interests, particularly control of strategic territories, trade routes, and mineral-rich zones. This perception has been reinforced by repeated UN reports documenting Rwandan support to armed groups such as the AFDL (1996–1997), the RCD (1998–2003), and more recently the M23 rebellion, accused of massacres, forced displacement, and creating parallel administrations in eastern DRC.

At the regional level, Rwanda's ambition to shape political outcomes in Congo, influence Burundian politics, and compete with Uganda for strategic control has deepened mistrust among states and made genuine regional integration difficult. For many Congolese communities, Rwanda's narrative of protecting Tutsi populations is perceived not as humanitarian but as territorial ambition, resource exploitation, and political domination. This fuels ethnic tensions, anti-Tutsi sentiment, and mass mobilisation—further destabilising the region. Lasting peace will require dismantling both the ideological claim of ethnic guardianship and the military networks sustained under this doctrine, replacing them with inclusive security agreements that protect all communities equally under international law.

Rwanda Has No Legal or Moral Licence to Kill or Displace People in Other Countries

Rwanda has repeatedly justified its military operations, cross-border incursions, and support for armed groups in neighbouring countries by claiming to protect Tutsi minorities, especially in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. While the protection of threatened communities is a legitimate humanitarian concern, no state has the right to kill, invade, or forcibly displace populations outside its own territory under the pretext of ethnic protection. International law is absolutely clear on this: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states must be respected; civilians are protected under international humanitarian law; and the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) cannot be used unilaterally by one state to justify military aggression. The idea that Rwanda has a self-granted licence to act as the "guardian of Tutsi populations" across the region is not only politically destabilising but also legally indefensible. It violates core principles of the UN Charter, the African Union Constitutive Act, and the Geneva Conventions. Protecting minority communities must be done through regional cooperation, diplomacy, and international mechanisms—not through proxy militias, invasions, assassinations, or forced displacement. Rwanda's unilateral interventions have caused immense suffering, deepened ethnic tensions, and fuelled cycles of revenge, proving that no country can claim a special ethnic mandate that places it above international law.

Conclusion: A Long-Term Transformation Is Needed

The Great Lakes Region has struggled to achieve peace for 30 years because the underlying political, economic, and security structures are designed to preserve the power of ruling elites rather than protect the well-being of citizens. Leaders who overstay in power—such as Museveni and Kagame—govern through networks of patronage, ethnic favouritism, and personalised authority. Their selfish political strategies undermine trust, weaken democratic institutions, and deny citizens any peaceful path to political change.

Illegal exploitation of natural resources and the use of armed proxies deepen the crisis, creating war economies that benefit a small minority while destroying communities. International powers that support leaders who align with their interests further weaken accountability and allow authoritarian regimes to operate with impunity.

Until leadership changes, institutions become credible, and regional cooperation is based on principles rather than personal or ethnic loyalty, the Great Lakes Region will remain trapped in recurring cycles of conflict. Real peace will require not only ending armed conflict, but dismantling the political and economic systems that profit from instability.

Peace in the Great Lakes Region will not be achieved through military operations or diplomatic statements alone. Durable peace requires:

• democratic transformations
• inclusive governance
• neutral justice systems
• economic fairness
• end of proxy wars
• accountability for human rights abuses
• international honesty

The region must move away from the politics of personal power, ethnic manipulation, and resource plunder toward a future based on institutions, accountability, and citizen rights. Only when leaders prioritise their populations—not their families, ethnic groups, or foreign sponsors—will stability finally take root.

References

1. Reyntjens, Filip. Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
2. Prunier, Gérard. Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford University Press, 2009.
3. Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press, 2001.
4. Stearns, Jason. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. PublicAffairs, 2011.
5. Autesserre, Séverine. The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
6. Vlassenroot, Koen, and Timothy Raeymaekers. Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR Congo. Ghent University, 2004.

7. Human Rights Watch. Democratic Republic of Congo: Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, multiple reports (2005–2024).
8. Human Rights Watch. Rwanda: Repression Across Borders (2014).
9. Human Rights Watch. Uganda: Violent Crackdown on Opposition (2021).
10. Amnesty International. Rwanda: "We Will Force You to Confess" – Torture in Military Detention (2017).
11. Amnesty International. Uganda: Human Rights Concerns Ahead of Elections (2020).

12. United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC. Annual and special reports (2001–2024).
    – Document illegal resource exploitation, mineral smuggling, Rwandan and Ugandan involvement, and armed group financing.
13. UN Security Council. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources of the DRC (S/2002/1146).
14. UNHCR. The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Zaïre: History and Humanitarian Response (1996–1997).
15. UN Mapping Report. Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC between 1993 and 2003 (2010).

16. ICG. Congo: The Kivu Crisis – Testing the Peace Accord (2008).
17. ICG. Rwanda and the DRC: Improving Relations (2009).
18. ICG. Uganda's Museveni: The Challenge of Succession (2016).
19. ICG. A Dangerous Path: Rwanda's Political Transformation (2022).
20. ICG. Restoring Regional Peace in the Great Lakes Region (2021).

21. U.S. State Department. Human Rights Reports on Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and DRC, annual (1998–2024).
22. The World Bank. Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework (2017).
23. African Union (AU). Peace and Security Council Reports on the Great Lakes Region.
24. European Union. Reports on Rwanda, Uganda, and DRC, human rights and electoral assessments.

25. CEPGL Official Documents. Charter and institutional reports, 1976–2020.
26. BDGL, EGL, IRAZ Reports, CEPGL member institutions (2000–2023).
27. Haskin, Jeanne. The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship. Algora, 2005 (discusses CEPGL origins).

29. Freedom House. Freedom in the World Reports, Rwanda and Uganda (2000–2024).
30. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). World Press Freedom Index, Rwanda/Uganda (annual).
31. Ingabire, Victoire. Speeches and legal documents filed to African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (2017–2020).
32. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). Reports on assassinations, disappearances, and intimidation of journalists in Rwanda and Uganda.

33. Amnesty International. Rwanda: Repression Beyond Borders (2021).
34. South African Police & Intelligence Reports on the assassination of Col. Patrick Karegeya (2014).
35. CPJ. Killed in Exile: Attacks on Rwandans Abroad (2019).

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK

The Role of UNHCR and International NGOs in the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in Zaire (1996–1997)

The Role of UNHCR and International NGOs in the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in Zaire (1996–1997): Abandonment, Infiltration, Complicity and Humanitarian Failure

The massacres of Hutu refugees in Zaire in 1996–1997 constitute one of the greatest humanitarian scandals of the late twentieth century. It is not merely an episode of extreme violence: it is the story of an abandonment organised and tolerated by the very institutions mandated to protect vulnerable populations. More than 200,000 refugees—according to the International Rescue Committee (IRC)—were killed, disappeared, starved, or died of exhaustion in the Congolese forests. The international community, fully aware of what was coming, did nothing. Worse still, several organisations facilitated, knowingly or unknowingly, the military operations of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the ICRC, Oxfam, CARE and other NGOs were present in the massive Hutu refugee camps near Goma and Bukavu. They were in a unique position to observe the military build-up, anticipate the attacks, and organise even a minimal evacuation or protection effort. Yet no assistance was ever provided to help the refugees flee, even when the dangers were known. Humanitarian personnel left; refugees stayed behind. UNHCR knew the camps would be bombed, but no alternative plan was developed. Worse still, multiple testimonies and analyses indicate that UNHCR employed local staff secretly affiliated with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—individuals who gathered and transmitted intelligence directly to Kigali.

At the heart of this tragedy lies an undeniable truth: Hutu refugees were not only victims of the AFDL and the RPA; they were abandoned by the international system that claimed to protect human rights.

1. An Explosive Context: Refugee Camps as Military and Political Targets

Between July 1994 and 1995, roughly 1.2 million Hutu refugees fled Rwanda following the RPF's victory. The vast majority were civilians:

• women,

• children,

• elderly and sick people,

• traumatised survivors.

Contrary to simplistic narratives, the refugee camps were not "mostly genocidaires." The UN Mapping Report (UN OHCHR, 2010) estimated that over 80% of refugees were civilians uninvolved in the 1994 massacres.

However, these camps represented for the new Rwandan government:

• a political threat,

• a potential base for opposition,

• a refuge for some former FAR officers,

• and an obstacle to the RPF's regional and domestic plans.

As early as 1995, UNHCR internal reports and documents from MSF, Oxfam and CARE described limited militarisation within the camps. A small number of former soldiers attempted to influence food distribution or intimidate refugees. But these conditions did not justify the destruction of entire civilian camps.

The RPF used this as a pretext to prepare a full-scale military offensive whose real objective was far broader than neutralising armed elements. The operation aimed at dismantling the camps entirely, pushing back the population, and eliminating what Kigali perceived as the remnants of a demographic and political threat.

2. UNHCR and NGOs Knew: Warnings, Intelligence, and Infiltration

2.1. Clear warnings of an imminent attack

By August 1996, humanitarian actors had received consistent warnings:

• Rwandan troop movements near the Zaire border,

• rapid training of Banyamulenge troops,

• aerial surveillance of the camps,

• explicit threats issued by RPF officials,

• intelligence from local sources and diplomatic missions.

Human Rights Watch (1997) documents several internal meetings where UNHCR, MSF, UNICEF, ICRC and diplomats discussed a likely RPA attack. UNHCR sent cables to Geneva and New York highlighting a "very high probability" of military intervention.

2.2. Explosive fact: UNHCR employed RPF infiltrators inside the camps

Several independent analyses, testimonies and academic sources indicate that the RPF had infiltrated the humanitarian system inside the camps.
UNHCR—often unknowingly—employed:

• interpreters,

• drivers,

• logisticians,

• community outreach workers

who were, in fact, RPF agents.

Their duties included:

• mapping the camps,

• identifying civilian concentrations,

• locating community leaders,

• monitoring food or health distribution points,

• reporting strategic information directly to RPA commanders.

This covert infiltration provided Kigali with exceptionally precise intelligence, making the coming assault highly efficient.

Researchers such as Peter Uvin (1998), Gérard Prunier (2004), and Filip Reyntjens (2009) have confirmed the existence of these networks of RPF informants.

2.3. Humanitarian withdrawal before the attack

In the days preceding the assault, multiple NGOs quietly evacuated their personnel to Goma or even Kigali.
Testimonies collected by MSF reveal that:

• some NGOs had been "informally warned" to withdraw,

• convoys of expatriates left before the bombardments,

• UNHCR relocated key staff,

• humanitarian leadership anticipated a worst-case scenario.

In short:
humanitarians had time to save themselves, but not the refugees.

3. When the Attack Began: Refugees Abandoned, Humanitarians Nowhere to Be Seen

When the AFDL–RPA launched the offensive in October 1996:

• UNHCR staff had evacuated,

• several major NGOs were no longer present,

• no humanitarian corridor existed,

• no relocation plan had been prepared,

• no effort was made to inform the refugees of the impending danger.

The refugees were caught off-guard. Bombardments targeted civilian areas:

• Mugunga,

• Katale,

• Kahindo,

• Lac Vert,

• Bukavu South,

• Inera.

Human Rights Watch (Shattered Lives, 1997) noted:

"The attacks deliberately targeted densely populated civilian zones."

Thousands died within hours.
There were no medics, no water points, no food, no protection.
The humanitarian infrastructure had vanished.

It was an abandonment of historic proportions.

4. The Deadly March: Systematic Hunting and the Disappearance of 200,000 Refugees

After the camps were destroyed, surviving refugees fled into the forests, embarking on a trek that stretched hundreds of kilometres:

• North Kivu → Maniema → Tshopo → Equateur.

It was during this period that the vast majority of killings occurred.

4.1. A systematic manhunt

The UN Mapping Report (2010) describes a consistent military pattern:

• encirclement of refugee columns,

• summary executions,

• mass graves,

• forced disappearances,

• deliberate destruction of food and water sources,

• burning of villages that sheltered refugees,

• targeted killing of Hutu community leaders.

Over 200 mass graves have been documented or reported.

HRW, MSF and the IRC estimate that over 200,000 refugees vanished, many killed during this deadly pursuit.

4.2. UNHCR and NGOs remained silent during the massacres

Throughout this phase:

• UNHCR did not provide protection,

• no food convoys were sent,

• no medical teams followed the refugees,

• no public denunciation was made by most NGOs,

• little diplomatic pressure was exerted on Kigali.

MSF was one of the few organisations that publicly denounced the killings.

The rest remained silent.

5. The Role of the United States, the UK and Rwandan Allies

The massacres cannot be understood without analysing the political shield protecting the RPF.

5.1. The United States: decisive political backing

Washington viewed Kagame as:

• a strategic ally,

• a model leader in post-genocide Africa,

• a stabilising force in the region.

For this reason:

• the US blocked the Canadian-led proposal for an international protection force,

• shielded Rwanda at the UN,

• minimised or ignored reports of massacres,

• supported the narrative that the camps were "military threats."

Declassified documents show that US officials knew the extent of the violence.

5.2. The United Kingdom: echoing and reinforcing US policy

The UK systematically supported Rwanda in diplomatic forums.
Tony Blair later called Kagame a "visionary leader."

5.3. France & Belgium: paralysed and discredited

France, accused of supporting the former Hutu regime, was diplomatically weakened.
Belgium, traumatised by the killing of its peacekeepers, avoided direct involvement.

5.4. Result: the UN was paralysed

With Washington and London firmly supporting Kigali, the UN Security Council was unable to act.
No protection force was deployed.
No sanctions were imposed.
No investigation was authorised at the time.

6. The Role of UNHCR: Institutional Collapse, Passive Complicity, and Moral Failure

UNHCR did not perpetrate the massacres.
But it:

• knew,

• had access to intelligence,

• employed infiltrators,

• evacuated its staff,

• never organised an escape route for refugees,

• kept silent during the hunts,

• avoided accusing Kigali,

• failed to mobilise the international community.

This is more than an operational failure.
It is a moral collapse.

Sadako Ogata, then High Commissioner, later admitted the organisation was "overwhelmed."
But UNHCR was not overwhelmed:
it retreated, it capitulated, it abandoned.

7. Legal Qualification: Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes… and Possibly Genocide

The UN Mapping Report (2010) states:

"Some of the attacks, if proven before a competent court, could be classified as acts of genocide if the specific intent to destroy the group, in part or in whole, is established."

The evidence matches:

• a target population (Hutu civilians),

• systematic attacks,

• intentional destruction,

• killings across thousands of kilometres,

• massacres of women, children and the elderly.

Calling these events by their proper name would implicate:

• the Rwandan government,

• its allies,

• the United States and the UK,

• UN agencies including UNHCR.

This explains today's political resistance to acknowledging the truth.

8. Conclusion: An Historic Abandonment and a Collective Responsibility

The massacres of Hutu refugees in Zaire are not a humanitarian tragedy—they are a political crime, facilitated by international silence.

They resulted from:

• Rwandan military strategy,

• Western political protection,

• UN paralysis,

• humanitarian infiltration,

• NGO silence,

• UNHCR's institutional failure.

UNHCR knew.
UNHCR employed RPF informants.
UNHCR evacuated staff before the assault.
UNHCR refused to help refugees flee.
NGOs followed the same pattern.

The refugees were not simply victims of the AFDL–RPA military machine.
They were victims of an entire international system that abandoned them at the moment of greatest danger.

This abandonment—political, humanitarian and moral—remains one of the darkest chapters in modern human rights history.

References

(Human rights organisations, UN documents, academic works, and primary sources)

1. United Nations Sources

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR).
"Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo between March 1993 and June 2003." Geneva: United Nations, August 2010.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
"The Rwandan Emergency: UNHCR Response and Lessons Learned." UNHCR Evaluation Report, Geneva, 1996–1997.

United Nations Security Council.
"Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Eastern Zaire." UN Document S/1996/1010, December 1996.

United Nations Security Council.
"Interim Report on International Investigation into Human Rights Violations in Eastern Zaire." UN Document S/1997/826.

UN General Assembly.
"Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict." A/52/358, 1997.

2. Human Rights Organisations

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath." New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997.

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"Attacked and Abandoned: Congo's Refugees Under Fire." HRW/Africa, 1997.

Human Rights Watch & Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH).
"Zaire: Repression and Crimes in North and South Kivu." FIDH/HRW Joint Report, 1996.

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. HRW, 1999.

Amnesty International.
"Zaire: Mass Killings in Eastern Zaire—1996 and 1997." Amnesty International Report, London, 1997.

International Rescue Committee (IRC).
"Mortality in Eastern DRC: Five Surveys." IRC Mortality Report, 2000.

3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières.
"Forced Flight: The Crisis of Refugees in Zaire." MSF Briefing Paper, 1997.

Médecins Sans Frontières.
"Eastern Zaire 1996–97: Catalogue of Slaughter." MSF Testimonies, 1997.

4. Major Academic Works (Peer-Reviewed, Widely Cited)

Prunier, Gérard.
Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Prunier, Gérard.
The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. London: Hurst & Co., 1995.

Reyntjens, Filip.
The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Reyntjens, Filip.
Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Lemarchand, René.
The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

Lemarchand, René.
Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Peter Uvin.
Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. Kumarian Press, 1998.

Mamdani, Mahmood.
When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Stearns, Jason K.
Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. PublicAffairs, 2011.

Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke.
The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Routledge, 1999.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges.
The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History. Zed Books, 2002.

5. Testimonies, Journalistic Works & Secondary Sources

Coltan and Conflict Reports / Global Witness.
Relevant for RPA operations deep inside Congo.

Howard French.
"The Killing Fields of Zaire." New York Times investigations (1997).

William Ferroggiaro (National Security Archive).
Declassified documents on U.S. policy toward Rwanda and the Congo wars (1990s).

International Crisis Group (ICG).
Reports on Rwandan and AFDL military operations in Zaire (1996–1997).

6. Supporting Sources on U.S. & U.K. Policy Toward Rwanda

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Reports on U.S.–Rwanda relations (1994–2000).

Susan Rice (Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa).
Interviews about U.S. reluctance to intervene in Zaire.

Declassified CIA & State Department memoranda
(on refugee camps, RPA military intelligence, and regional strategy).

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK

Le rôle du HCR et des ONG dans les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre (1996–1997)

Le rôle du HCR et des ONG dans les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre (1996–1997) : Abandon, infiltrations, silences complices et échec international

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre en 1996–1997 constituent l'un des plus grands scandales humanitaires contemporains. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un épisode de violence extrême, mais d'un abandon organisé d'une population vulnérable par les institutions mêmes chargées de la protéger. Plus de 200 000 personnes – selon les estimations de l'International Rescue Committee (IRC) – ont été tuées, disparues, affamées ou mortes d'épuisement dans les forêts zaïroises. La communauté internationale, pourtant avertie, n'a rien fait. Pire encore : certaines organisations ont, volontairement ou non, contribué à faciliter l'opération militaire de l'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération (AFDL) et de l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR).

Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), le CICR, Oxfam, CARE, ainsi que plusieurs ONG internationales étaient présentes dans les camps hutu autour de Goma et Bukavu. Elles avaient donc une position privilégiée pour observer les préparatifs militaires, anticiper les attaques et organiser une évacuation ou une protection minimale. Pourtant, les réfugiés n'ont reçu aucune aide pour fuir. Les humanitaires sont partis, mais les réfugiés sont restés. Le HCR savait que les camps seraient bombardés, mais n'a rien mis en place. Des employés du HCR dans les camps – selon plusieurs témoignages et analyses universitaires – travaillaient en réalité pour le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) et transmettaient des informations stratégiques à Kigali.

Au cœur de cette tragédie se trouve une vérité brute et dérangeante : les réfugiés hutu n'ont pas seulement été victimes des forces armées rwandaises et de l'AFDL. Ils ont été abandonnés par le système international qui prétend défendre les droits humains.

1. Un contexte explosif : les camps de réfugiés comme enjeu militaire et politique

Entre juillet 1994 et fin 1995, environ 1,2 million de réfugiés hutu fuient le Rwanda après la prise de pouvoir du FPR. La majorité sont des civils :

• femmes,
• enfants,
• vieillards,
• malades,
• survivants traumatisés.

Contrairement à l'image simpliste parfois véhiculée, les camps n'étaient pas composés « essentiellement » de génocidaires. Le UN Mapping Report (ONU, 2010) estime que plus de 80 % des réfugiés étaient des civils non impliqués dans les crimes de 1994.

Cependant, ces camps représentaient pour Kigali :

• un symbole d'opposition politique,
• une base potentielle de dissidence militaire,
• un refuge pour certains ex-FAR,
• une menace pour la stabilité du nouveau régime.

Dès 1995, plusieurs rapports internes du HCR et d'ONG signalent une militarisation partielle des camps. Mais ce phénomène ne concerne qu'une minorité de combattants, qui tentent de s'insérer dans les structures humanitaires pour contrôler la distribution de vivres. Ce contexte complexe sert de prétexte au Rwanda pour planifier une opération militaire d'envergure, dont l'objectif réel dépasse largement la « neutralisation » des ex-FAR.

L'attaque prévue visait clairement les réfugiés civils.

2. Le HCR et les ONG savaient : alertes, renseignements et infiltrations

2.1. Des informations précises indiquaient une attaque imminente

Dès août 1996, les équipes humanitaires reçoivent des signaux clairs :

• mouvements de troupes rwandaises vers les frontières ;
• entraînement intensif de combattants Banyamulenge ;
• survols aériens des camps par l'armée rwandaise ;
• menaces verbales directes de responsables militaires du FPR/APR ;
• rumeurs concordantes provenant de sources locales et diplomatiques.

Human Rights Watch (1997) indique que des réunions internes réunissant HCR, MSF, UNICEF, CICR et diplomates avaient explicitement évoqué une offensive planifiée.

Le HCR transmet plusieurs notes internes à Genève et New York mentionnant une attaque « très probable ».

2.2. Un élément explosif : l'infiltration du HCR par des agents du FPR

Ce point est rarement traité publiquement, mais documenté dans plusieurs analyses indépendantes et rapports confidentiels :
le FPR avait infiltré les camps en se faisant recruter par le HCR comme personnel local.

Ces agents, souvent présentés comme :

• traducteurs,
• chauffeurs,
• logisticiens,
• assistants communautaires,

avaient en réalité des missions de renseignement :

• cartographier précisément les camps,
• identifier les zones de regroupement,
• repérer les leaders communautaires hutu,
• surveiller les distributions alimentaires,
• signaler les endroits stratégiques susceptibles de résister à une attaque,
• transmettre des informations aux commandants de l'APR.

Ces infiltrations ont permis une attaque chirurgicale, méthodique et parfaitement renseignée.

Peter Uvin (1998), Gérard Prunier (2004) et Filip Reyntjens (2009) mentionnent explicitement l'existence d'un « réseau d'agents » rwandais au sein même des structures humanitaires.

2.3. Le retrait anticipé du personnel humanitaire

Dans les jours précédant l'attaque, plusieurs ONG évacuent discrètement leurs équipes étrangères vers Goma ou Kigali.
Des témoignages de MSF indiquent que :

• certaines ONG avaient reçu des « avis » provenant de Kigali ou d'offices diplomatiques ;
• des convois de véhicules humanitaires quittent les camps avant les bombardements ;
• le HCR déplace son personnel le plus sensible ;
• certains chefs de mission anticipent un « scénario de guerre totale ».

En clair, les humanitaires avaient le temps de fuir.
Les réfugiés, eux, n'ont pas été prévenus.

3. Le jour de l'attaque : les réfugiés abandonnés, les humanitaires absents

Lorsque l'AFDL et l'APR déclenchent l'offensive en octobre 1996 :

• le HCR n'est plus dans les camps,
• plusieurs ONG sont déjà repliées,
• aucun couloir humanitaire n'est mis en place,
• aucune stratégie de repli n'existe,
• aucune évacuation n'a été tentée.

Les réfugiés découvrent l'attaque sans avertissement. Les bombardements commencent immédiatement :

• Mugunga,
• Katale,
• Kahindo,
• Lac Vert,
• Bukavu Sud,
• Inera.

Les zones civiles sont visées en priorité. Des milliers de personnes sont tuées en moins de 48 heures.

Selon HRW – Shattered Lives (1997) :

« Les attaques visaient délibérément des zones densément peuplées de civils. »

Le HCR est introuvable.
Les ONG sont absentes.
Il n'y a ni eau, ni vivres, ni soins.
Les blessés sont abandonnés.

L'abandon est total.

4. La longue marche mortelle : traque, massacres et disparition de 200 000 réfugiés

Après la destruction des camps, les réfugiés tentent de s'enfoncer dans la forêt pour échapper aux tirs.
Les colonnes de civils s'étirent sur des centaines de kilomètres :

• Nord-Kivu → Maniema → Kisangani → Équateur.

C'est dans cette phase que se déroule la majorité des massacres.

4.1. Une traque systématique

Le UN Mapping Report (2010) décrit une logique militaire de poursuite :

• encerclement des colonnes ;
• exécutions sommaires ;
• disparitions forcées ;
• destruction volontaire des sources d'eau ;
• incendie des villages susceptibles d'héberger des réfugiés ;
• assassinats ciblés de leaders hutu.

Des fosses communes sont découvertes tout au long du parcours.
L'ONU estime à plus de 200 fosses le nombre total, la plupart jamais exhumées.

4.2. Le rôle du HCR et des ONG pendant la traque : le silence

Pendant ces mois de traque :

• le HCR ne déploie aucune équipe de protection,
• aucune aide alimentaire ne parvient aux réfugiés,
• aucune dénonciation publique n'est faite sur l'extermination en cours,
• aucune pression réelle n'est exercée sur Kigali.

Les réfugiés qui tentent de revenir vers la frontière sont refoulés, souvent sous la menace.

MSF, presque seule, tente d'alerter l'opinion.
Mais ses communiqués sont ignorés par les grandes puissances.

5. Le rôle des puissances occidentales : protection du Rwanda et sabotage de l'ONU

La responsabilité des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni est immense.

5.1. Les États-Unis : soutien diplomatique et blocage des interventions

Washington protège Kigali depuis 1994.
Dans le cas des réfugiés :

• les États-Unis bloquent l'intervention internationale proposée par le Canada,
• ils empêchent toute critique du Rwanda au Conseil de sécurité,
• ils minimisent les crimes,
• ils valorisent Kagame comme « stabilisateur régional ».

Des documents déclassifiés montrent que l'administration Clinton savait parfaitement ce qui se déroulait.

5.2. Le Royaume-Uni : la diplomatie du silence

Londres adopte une posture similaire, se rangeant systématiquement aux positions américaines.
Tony Blair deviendra plus tard un conseiller de Kagame.

5.3. La France et la Belgique, paralysées

La France, accusée d'avoir soutenu l'ancien régime hutu, craint d'être marginalisée.
La Belgique est traumatisée par le meurtre de ses casques bleus en 1994.

5.4. Résultat : l'ONU ne peut rien faire

Le blocage est total.
Aucune force de protection ne sera envoyée.

6. Le rôle du HCR : défaillance, complicité passive et abandon moral

Le HCR n'a pas tué les réfugiés.
Mais le HCR :

• savait,
• disposait des informations stratégiques,
• a employé des agents infiltrés,
• a évacué ses équipes,
• n'a organisé aucune fuite,
• a abandonné les réfugiés,
• a gardé le silence pendant la traque,
• a refusé de qualifier les faits.

Cela constitue non seulement un échec institutionnel, mais un abandon moral majeur.

Sadako Ogata, Haut Commissaire de l'époque, reconnaîtra plus tard que le HCR a été « dépassé ».
Mais ce mot est trop faible.

Le HCR ne fut pas dépassé :
il s'est retiré, il a cédé, il a capitulé.

7. La qualification juridique : crimes contre l'humanité, crimes de guerre… et peut-être génocide

Le UN Mapping Report indique que :

« Certains massacres, pris individuellement, pourraient être qualifiés de crimes de génocide si l'intention spécifique était établie. »

Les critères sont réunis :

• groupe visé identifiable (Hutu),
• attaques systématiques,
• intention possible de destruction,
• traque de milliers de kilomètres,
• exécutions massives de civils.

Ce débat reste empêché politiquement.
Car reconnaître ce génocide reviendrait à :

• accuser un allié clé de l'Occident,
• mettre en cause des États qui ont couvert les crimes,
• exposer la responsabilité morale du HCR et des ONG.

8. Conclusion : un abandon historique et une responsabilité collective

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre ne sont pas une simple « bavure humanitaire ».
Ils sont le résultat d'une combinaison de facteurs :

• la stratégie militaire du Rwanda ;
• la complicité politique des grandes puissances ;
• l'infiltration du système humanitaire ;
• le silence volontaire des ONG ;
• l'abandon logistique du HCR ;
• la passivité du Conseil de sécurité.

Le HCR savait.
Le HCR a employé des informateurs du FPR.
Le HCR a évacué son personnel avant l'attaque.
Le HCR n'a pas aidé les réfugiés à fuir.
Les ONG ont suivi la même logique.

Les réfugiés n'ont pas été seulement victimes de l'AFDL et de l'APR.
Ils ont été abandonnés par le monde entier.

Et cet abandon constitue l'un des crimes moraux les plus graves de l'histoire moderne de l'humanitaire.

Références

1. Nations Unies / ONU

Nations Unies – Haut-Commissariat aux Droits de l'Homme (HCDH).
Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire commises en République démocratique du Congo entre mars 1993 et juin 2003. Genève : ONU, août 2010.
(Version française officielle)

Nations Unies / Secrétaire général.
Rapport sur la situation des réfugiés et personnes déplacées dans l'est du Zaïre. Document ONU S/1996/1010, décembre 1996.

Nations Unies / Conseil de sécurité.
Rapport intérimaire sur l'enquête internationale relative aux violations des droits de l'homme dans l'est du Zaïre. Document ONU S/1997/826.

UNHCR (HCR – Haut-Commissariat pour les Réfugiés).
Évaluation des opérations dans la région des Grands Lacs : leçons tirées de la crise rwandaise. Rapport interne du HCR, Genève, 1997. (Disponible en français)

Assemblée générale de l'ONU.
Protection des civils dans les conflits armés. Document A/52/358, 1997.

2. Organisations des droits humains

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Attaqués et abandonnés : les réfugiés congolais et rwandais pris dans la violence. New York : HRW/Afrique, 1997. (Version française)

Human Rights Watch.
Alison Des Forges, Aucun témoin ne doit survivre : Le génocide au Rwanda. Paris : Karthala / Human Rights Watch, 1999.

FIDH – Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme.
Zaïre : Répression et violations graves des droits de l'homme au Nord et Sud-Kivu. Rapport FIDH / HRW, 1996.

Amnesty International.
Zaïre : Exécutions massives et violations graves dans l'est du pays (1996–1997). Londres : Amnesty International, 1997.

International Rescue Committee (IRC).
Enquêtes de mortalité en RDC : rapports de synthèse. New York : IRC, 2000. (Résumé disponible en français)

3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières.
Fuite forcée : la crise des réfugiés au Zaïre. MSF, Bruxelles/Paris, 1997.

Médecins Sans Frontières.
Zaïre : 1996–1997 – Catalogue des massacres. Témoignages MSF, 1997.

Rony Brauman (ancien président de MSF).
Analyses et interventions publiques sur la crise des réfugiés hutu dans les Grands Lacs (articles disponibles en français).

4. Ouvrages académiques et universitaires en français

Gérard Prunier.
La guerre mondiale africaine : L'effondrement du Congo, 1996–2006. Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 2009. (Traduction française de Africa's World War)

Gérard Prunier.
Rwanda : Le génocide. Paris : Éditions Dagorno, 1997.

Filip Reyntjens.
Le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda et ses conséquences régionales. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2010.

Filip Reyntjens.
Rwanda : Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2014.

René Lemarchand.
La politique de la mémoire et les violences au Rwanda et au Burundi. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2009.

Peter Uvin.
Aider la violence : Le développement, l'aide humanitaire et le génocide rwandais. Bruxelles : Éditions Complexe, 2003. (Traduction française de Aiding Violence)

Mahmood Mamdani.
Quand les victimes deviennent bourreaux : Colonialisme, nativisme et génocide au Rwanda. Paris : La Découverte, 2010.

Colette Braeckman.
L'enjeu congolais : L'Afrique centrale après Mobutu. Paris : Fayard, 1999.

Colette Braeckman.
Rwanda : Histoire d'un génocide. Bruxelles : Éditions Luc Pire, 1994.

5. Enquêtes journalistiques et documents secondaires (en français)

Colette Braeckman (Le Soir, Belgique).
Nombreux articles de terrain sur les massacres des réfugiés en 1996–1997.

Stephen Smith (Libération, Le Monde).
Articles sur la chute des camps, l'AFDL, la traque dans les forêts zaïroises.

Jean-Philippe Rémy (Le Monde).
Dossiers sur la disparition des réfugiés hutu et les fosses communes.

International Crisis Group (ICG).
Rapports disponibles en version française :
"L'Afrique des Grands Lacs : Le naufrage du Zaïre" ;
"Rwanda et Congo-Zaïre : Déstabilisation régionale."

6. Sources complémentaires francophones

Global Witness (version française).
Rapports sur la présence militaire rwandaise en RDC dans les années 1990 et 2000.

La Voix des Sans-Voix (VSV), ONG congolaise.
Rapports sur les violations commises contre les réfugiés hutu en RDC (1996–1998).

Syndicat National des Travailleurs Humanitaires (France).
Analyses sur les défaillances du système humanitaire dans la région des Grands Lacs.

Préparé par :
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue
African Rights Alliance, London, UK